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 I. INTRODUCTION  
By the end of 1991, Russia saw the end to an intense struggle between the forces 
of change and the forces defending the old communist order.  The communist rule came 
to an end and the Soviet Union disintegrated.  Russia now faced the need for profound 
change, accompanied by widespread distress.  The transition from the Soviet communist 
regime to a democratic, market-oriented system had plunged Russia into a deep economic 
depression and left the newly independent states of Central Asia to fend for themselves.   
Out of this situation a new society arose with gaping inequality and widespread poverty, 
suffering from pervasive corruption and criminality.  Additionally, the Central Asian 
states have seen a rapid spread of illegal drugs and drug usage throughout the area since 
the breakup.  Heroin, opium, hashish, cocaine, and many other large-scale drugs have 
spread throughout the region in epidemic proportions.  The Central Asian nations of:  
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, have all seen a 
dramatic rise in drug trafficking and use.  All of the Central Asian states have been slow 
to admit that they face a serious danger.   
A number of factors in the 1990’s contributed to a sharp rise of drug trafficking 
and abuse that had been rare until then.  First, with the break-up of the USSR and the 
withdrawal of Soviet/Russian border guards from many of the republics, the newly 
independent states were left with limited resources to guard themselves.  The secure 
borders that once were strong had become porous.  Secondly, participants in the Afghan 
civil war wanted to find new means of support to replace the subsidies once plentiful 
from Moscow or Washington.  In the mid-1990’s opium cultivation became an 
increasingly important source of revenue for all sides, as well as for farmers who saw 
poppies as one of the most lucrative cash crops in a poor country.  Lastly, by the end of 
the decade Afghanistan was a major opium producer, with almost half of its population 
believed to be involved in some aspect of cultivation, production or trafficking.  The 
wider Central Asia region was experiencing a sharp rise in drug addiction. 
Tajikistan is not a major producer of narcotics, but is a major transit country for 
heroin and opium from Afghanistan.  The opium/heroin moves through Tajikistan 
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through Central Asia and on to Russian and European markets, and it generally does not 
enter the United States.  The volume of drugs following this route via multiple methods 
of transportation is significant and growing.  Although there were dramatic gains in the 
total volume of drugs seized, the Government of Tajikistan (GOT) continued to have 
difficulty combating drug trafficking and other narcotics-related problems in a 
coordinated manner.  Drug abuse of heroin, opium, and cannabis in Tajikistan is a 
growing problem.  Tajikistan’s medical infrastructure is highly inadequate and cannot 
address the population’s growing need for addiction treatment and rehabilitation.  
Geography and economics have made Tajikistan an attractive transit route for illegal 
narcotics.  Its border with opium-producing Afghanistan, which is dominated by 
mountainous terrain, is thinly guarded, difficult to patrol, and easily crossed without 
inspection at a number of points.  The disruption of normal economic activity during the 
1992-1997 civil war gave rise to a warlord class whose leaders continue to jostle for 
control of the lucrative narcotics trade.  With the average monthly income in the country 
remaining below U.S. $10, the temptation to become involved in narcotics-related 
transactions remains high for many segments of society.  In-country cultivation of 
narcotic crops is minimal, and the GOT is unaware of any processing or precursor 
chemical production facilities. 
The primary question that needs to be answered is: 
* What measures need to be taken in order to stop illegal drug trafficking and use 
across the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border? 
The purpose of this thesis is to look at the growing trend of drug trafficking and 
use throughout Afghanistan and Tajikistan and the porous border the two countries share.  
Russia, Eastern Europe and countries throughout Western Europe have all seen a 
dramatic increase in drug use due to drug trafficking across the porous border between 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan.  The spread of illegal drug trafficking from Afghanistan is 
even making it as far as the United States.  In addition to drug trafficking, drug use and 
communicable diseases are increasing at vast rates.  The upsurge in Intravenous Drug 
Users (IDU’s) is creating a great dilemma for many nations.  Russia’s population is 
declining and it is estimated that “by the end of 2050, the Russian population would 
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shrink by 30 percent, from 143.6 million to 101.9 million.”1 Drug use plays a major role 
in the depopulation of Russia with the rise of IDU’s and HIV/AIDS.  Additionally, with 
the rise in HIV/AIDS, drug use is of major concern since its effects can be seen around 
the globe.  The United States and Russia need to focus attention on the drug trafficking 
dilemma and work toward strengthening the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
Chapter II will discuss why drug trafficking has shifted to Tajikistan, the 
economics involved, the effects of drug production and trafficking and why the United 
States and Russia should concern themselves with the problems.  In 2000, it was 
estimated that 75 percent of the world’s opium supply came from Afghanistan.2 Since 
then those numbers have grown.  Given the economic importance of opium poppies to 
Afghanistan’s own economy, the effectiveness of their ban on cultivation has been less 
than impressive.  Several measures for prohibition have been attempted with successful 
short-term results, but long-term results have been negative.  The Taliban has attempted 
to stop the production of opium grown on its land, but the events since 9/11 have severely 
stifled those efforts.  It is estimated that as much as half of its population and 80 percent 
of the economy was in some way connected to the drug trade.3  Opium poppies have 
been known to grow in 27 of the 29 provinces, and some 200,000 Afghan households 
were involved in this cultivation.4 Additionally, over 200 laboratories for processing 
opium into heroin were believed to be in the country, each capable of producing ten 
kilograms of heroin daily.  Countries in Central Asia have sought to stop opium 
production for 25 years, but the trend in Afghanistan has been just the opposite.   
Chapter III establishes why the Afghanistan-Tajikistan cross-border trafficking is 
the center of gravity and then analyzes trafficking groups and routes in Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan.  Tajikistan is not a major producer of opium or illegal drugs, but it is a 
gateway to the rest of Europe due to its porous borders.  The traditional poppy growing 
                                                 
1 Powell, David E.  “Death as a Way of Life:  Russia’s Demographic Decline.” Economic Digest, 
October 2002, p. 1. 
2 Filipov, David.  “Drug Trade Flourishes Again in Afghanistan.” Boston Globe, 31 October 2002, p. 
1. 
3 Philippe Noubel, “Afghan Drugs Feed Central Asian Habit,” The Times of Central Asia, 15 June 
2000, p. 24. 
4 Ibid, p. 24. 
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areas in Central Asia have been the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan.  Cannabis also 
grows in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic, but as its effects are less dangerous, it has not 
attracted as much attention or impacted as negatively on the area as opium and its 
processed derivative, heroin.  The new drug trade made its strongest initial routes into 
Tajikistan, where the situation was exacerbated by civil war between 1992-97.  Tajikistan 
is still recovering from its civil war, which left much of the country’s already 
impoverished economy in ruins.  Part of the Tajik population fled the fighting into 
Afghanistan, thus indirectly facilitating development of new transport networks.  The 
combination of its long border with Afghanistan and its barely functioning economy has 
made it the main gateway into Central Asia for Afghan opium and heroin.  Since 
Tajikistan is still facing many economic difficulties, the drug business has become an 
important source of income for many people.  Drug barons and other drug trafficking 
groups have a vested interest in maintaining the drug trade, as do many poor individuals 
living along transit routes who often have no other means of earning a living. 
Chapter IV examines the strategies and capacities of the border agencies and how 
they fall short.  Security problems resulting from the increasing flow of narcotics illegally 
smuggled across the 1200 km Tajikistan-Afghanistan border have become critical in 
understanding the nature of political instability within Central Asia.  Border security in 
Tajikistan is important in helping to stop the drug trade that plagues the country.  The 
most important security structure responsible for the security of the Tajik border is 
Russian, not a Tajik group.  In Tajikistan itself “the responsibility for border security is 
placed under two ‘power-ministries:’ the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Security.”5 
Though Tajikistan is clearly heavily reliant upon Russia for its border security it does, 
however, possess its own border guard force, though substantially smaller and less able to 
fulfill its functions as effectively.  The Tajik border guard service is structured in much 
the same way as the FPS, with its headquarters in Dushanbe and divided into regional 
districts responsible for the security of the state border.  The KOGG (Committee for the 
Protection of the State Border) is the Tajik border guard service.  Unfortunately, both 
agencies fall short of their mission and drug traffickers are able to get their supplies 
across with little resistance.  This chapter will specify in detail where each falls short 
                                                 
5 Ibid, p. 6. 
5 
The conclusion will examine the effect of drug trade and production and how 
states are taking action to slow this ever-growing problem.  Additionally, it will be 
necessary to show why the United States and Russia need to step up efforts to control 
drug trafficking and use in Tajikistan and Afghanistan.  Efforts need to be increased on 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
7 
II. TAJIKISTAN/AFGHANISTAN – DRUG EFFECTS, EXTENT 
AND ECONOMICS INVOLVED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In countries around the world, the issue of drugs touches the lives of young and 
old people across the socioeconomic spectrum: from people experimenting with the latest 
“party” drug to vulnerable and marginalized populations, including refugee and displaced 
children, young and old sex workers and soldiers, street children, and institutionalized 
persons, who use drugs to cope with a stressful existence.  Populations in the transition 
region are expanding at both ends of this continuum, and they are facing a drug issue that 
was unknown in their parents’ time.  Illicit drugs, especially in the narcotic family, were 
relatively absent under communism.  For instance, under communist rule travel was 
restricted, borders were tightly controlled, and local currencies were without value on the 
international market.  The changes triggered by the transition have, unfortunately, opened 
up the region not only to more democratic values and market forces, but also to the 
trafficking, production and use of drugs.   
The war on terrorism in Afghanistan following 9/11 saw the shift in drug 
trafficking routes and supply lines.  The declines of heroin seizures in Southwest Asia 
were largely related to the sharply reduced opium production in southern and eastern 
Afghanistan in 2001.  
The concentration of opium production in 2001 in northern Afghanistan 
meant that the northern route gained in importance. Thus heroin seizures 
in Central Asia rose by more than 55% in 2001.6  
The growing importance of the Northern route (silk road) for heroin leaving 
Afghanistan is a phenomenon that has been reflected in seizure statistics since the mid 
1990s.  Between 1998 and 2001 heroin seizures rose five-fold in Central Asia, as 
trafficking and the response to this increased, in particular by the Tajik authorities. “In 
both 2001 and 2002 about 85% of all heroin seizures reported from Central Asia were 
                                                 
6 Chawla, Sandeep, Thibault le Pichon, Thomas Pietschmann, Patrick Seramy, Aruna Nathwani, Johny 
Thomas, Ali Saadedin.  “Global Illicit Drug Trends 2003,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
Vienna and New York:  June 2003, p. 55.  
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made by the authorities in Tajikistan.”7 Chapter III will describe in greater detail the 
trafficking routes and organizations involved in transporting the drugs from Afghanistan 
through the northern route.   
In addition to the preceding example, the growing shift in the drug trade from the 
eastern, western and southern routes to the northern route are due to several other factors.  
This chapter will explain why Central Asia, in particular Tajikistan, has seen an increase 
in drug trafficking through the region, why other countries are not the focal route, the 
effects of drug abuse and neglect, and why the United States and Russia need to focus 
more attention on the Central Asian drug trafficking dilemma. 
B.   ECONOMIC STRUGGLES 
Economic struggles for both Afghanistan and Central Asia have made the region a 
perfect environment for drug trafficking and use.  Weakened governments, corrupt 
officials, lack of control and geography all contribute to the weakened state of the 
economy.  Reforms are currently being made to both Afghanistan’s and Tajikistan’s 
economic systems, but drug trafficking and production are creating delays in providing a 
more stable region.  Tajikistan’s economic struggles will be studied first followed by 
Afghanistan.  Additionally, an assessment of region will be provided along with reasons 
for the continued success of drugs in each area. 
All five countries in Central Asia have made progress toward decentralizing their 
economies, expanding international links, and diversifying and increasing production and 
trade.  Unfortunately, the changes in these economies have not been that great and much 
remains to be done in these countries.  Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been the two 
fastest reformers.  Kazakhstan has taken advantage of its rich resource base and more 
diversified economic structure.  Kyrgyzstan has been a little slower than Kazakhstan, but 
once it overcame its initial limitations, the country strengthened.  On the opposite side of 
the spectrum, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been more sporadic on their resource 
and output diversity.  The economic reforms of these two countries have not seen a 
steady increase or positive outcome.  Tajikistan, the last of the Central Asian states, has 
faced a different situation in their economic reforms.  They were plagued by Civil War 
                                                 
7 Ibid, p. 55. 
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from 1992 to 1997.  During this time period economic stability was not achievable.  The 
constant battles kept Tajikistan from being able to establish programs to achieve 
economic success. 
Tajikistan was the poorest of the Soviet Union’s socialist republics and remains 
the most impoverished country in the region today.  First hit by the cut in subsidies from 
Moscow, “which had funded 80 percent of the budget before independence, and then by a 
bloody civil war, it has struggled to lift living standards out of extreme poverty.”8  
Tajikistan has faced sharp output declines and erosions of living standards during its 
early years of transition.  There were severe disruptions to input supplies and traditional 
lines of production due to the civil unrest.  Tajikistan’s development agenda still remains 
challenging despite political stability and economic growth achieved after the end of civil 
war.  A large external debt complicates economic management and affects Tajikistan’s 
ability to reduce poverty.  Poverty remains the main challenge faced by Tajikistan. “Over 
80% of the country’s population are living in poverty, with children and the elderly 
particularly affected.”9 Poverty in Tajikistan encompasses low levels of income and 
consumption, limited earning opportunities, and poor and uneven access to basic public 
services such as education, healthcare, water supply and heat.  Due to the poor conditions 
in Tajikistan it has been said “A million Tajik men have fled to Russia to look for work, 
stranding their families here.”10 
Poverty drives drug involvement in Tajikistan, where the average family of five 
or six may have to get by on less than U.S. $10 per month.11 Employment is frequently 
through patronage and loyalty networks rather than qualifications.  People have to buy 
their jobs and positions in many sectors, and appointees are nominated as a form of 
reward.  As a result of the economic hardships in Tajikistan, it is estimated that some 30 
                                                 
8 ICG.  “Tajikistan:  A Roadmap For Development.” ICG Asia Report, Osh/Brussels, 24 April 2003, p. 
1. 
9 Van Dyck, Miriam.  “World Bank:  World Bank Launches New Strategy of Assistance for 
Tajikistan; Program Envisages Support Of Up To US $80 Million Over Next Three Years.” M2 Presswire, 
28 February 2003, p. 2. 
10 Kaiser, Robert G.  “Tajiks Upbeat About ‘Most Backward’ Republic; With Civil War Over, 
Stability Masks Crises In Former Soviet Land.” The Washington Post, Washington, D.C., August 1, 2002, 
pg. 1. 
11 Summary of Fact Finding Mission to Tajikistan, Open Society Institute, 2000, p. 2. 
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to 50 percent of all economic activity is reportedly linked to drug trafficking.  Poverty in 
turn leads to corruption (and vice versa). “Corruption is pervasive at all levels:  from the 
lowly civil servant demanding bribes to supplement his small salary to top ministers 
benefiting from kickbacks and the graft through agencies.”12  
In Afghanistan, several factors played a role in the development of Afghanistan’s 
opium economy.  The most important one was weak government control over the country 
in the 1980s and the 1990s.  As elsewhere in the world the lack, or collapse, of a central 
administration gave drug traffickers, criminal syndicates and terrorist groups the 
opportunity to develop an illegal economy for drugs, arms, contraband, and the provision 
of acolyte financing for further criminal activity.  Eventually, the economic system 
collapsed.  After more than 20 years of war and conflict the degradation of agricultural 
and other economic infrastructure was complete.  Irrigation channels, cultivation terraces, 
roads and warehousing, were all destroyed.  Agricultural production of legitimate crops 
cannot be sustained without some basic storage, marketing and transportation facilities.  
Opium does not face these limitations.  It is durable, easy to store and carry to the market.  
Opium markets, in any case, operated like spot and futures markets, with traders 
providing credit for future production, buying the opium in local bazaars or even at the 
farm-gate, and traffickers taking over the marketing.  As poppy cultivation became a 
lucrative agricultural activity, it is no surprise that it took over the best available land.  
The amount of land available for food production declined and the country’s food deficit 
became acute.  
As mentioned above, the opium economy developed in Afghanistan because of:  
lack of effective government administration until the recent past; degradation of 
agriculture and most economic infrastructure due to twenty years of war; a war economy 
and related black marketeering.  Through the 1980s and 1990s several competing factions 
financed their war efforts with opium revenue.  Since most of the opium producing 
provinces came under Taliban control after 1996, the Taliban reaped the largest gains 
from the opium economy.  The Taliban cultivation ban increased prices in 2001 and 
                                                 
12 ICG, p. 14. 
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revalued stocks by a factor of 10; more liquidity in the hands of traders thus created 
further incentives for the opium economy.13 
C. ECONOMICS OF DRUG TRADE 
Since Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Russia’s economies are in crisis, the drug 
business has become an important source of income for many people.  Drug barons have 
a vested interest in maintaining the drug trade, as do many poor individuals living along 
transit routes who often have no other means of earning a living.  Each area is fighting 
the battle over drug trafficking, use and production.  Due to the lucrative nature of the 
business, it has not been easy to try and deter individuals from participating in some area 
of this illegal business. 
Afghanistan, which has been previously mentioned, is the world’s leader in opium 
production and trade.  Attempts to stop the drug activities have had their positives and 
negatives to the region.  Given the economic importance of opium poppies to 
Afghanistan’s own economy, the effectiveness of their ban on cultivation has been 
impressive for the most part.  Unfortunately, prohibition has had a severe impact on the 
living standards in Afghanistan.  It is estimated that as much as half of its population and 
80 percent of the economy was in some way connected to the drug trade.14  Opium 
poppies have been known to grow in 27 of the 29 provinces, and some 200,000 Afghan 
households were involved in this cultivation.15 Additionally, over 200 laboratories for 
processing opium into heroin were believed to be in the country, each capable of 
producing ten kilograms of heroin daily. 
In Afghanistan, poverty has made drug production necessary for survival, and 
warlords have used it to consolidate their power.  Virtually the entire economy is black 
market, aside from aid money.   
                                                 
13 Chawla, Sandeep, Thomas Pietschmann, Thibault le Pichon, Aruna Nathwani, Johny Thomas, and 
Melissa Tullis.  “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New 
York, 2003, p. 76. 
14 Olcott, Martha Brill and Natalia Udalova.  “Working Papers:  Drug trafficking on the Great Silk 
Road:  The Security Environment in Central Asia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington D.C., Number 11, March 2000, p. 8. 
15 Philippe Noubel, “Afghan Drugs Feed Central Asian Habit,” The Times of Central Asia, 15 June 
2000, p. 24. 
12 
The legal exports are worth approximately $80 million, according to the 
CIA’s World Fact Book: mostly carpets, dried fruit, nuts.  The opium 
crop, at rock-bottom prices in Afghan markets, is worth at least $120 
million, based on UN estimates of $30 a kilogram in February 2000.16  
Since then, the wholesale price has jumped tenfold.  “The true value of the 
exported drugs, once they hit the streets in Moscow, Amsterdam, Geneva, London or 
New York, is estimated at up to $100 billion.”17 According to General Andrei Nikolayev, 
former director of the FPS,  
An amount of heroin costs $100 in Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan.  
Once it is smuggled across the River Panj in to the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), in Tajikistan its value increases to $1,000.  
As it is taken through Osh in Kyrgyzstan it increases to $10,000; when it 
reaches Europe it costs $100,000.18  
Afghanistan, like most other countries, has also been confronted with the problem 
of drug users committing crime to finance their habit.  With refugees returning and with 
prices of opiates having risen tenfold in 2001 and having remained at the higher levels in 
2002, it is likely that drug-related property crime will continue to increase for some time.   
In 2000, a kilogram of opium, i.e. the average annual requirement of an 
opium user, could be bought from the bazaars for around $39 per kg.  
Given reports of average wages of $1-$2 a day an average Afghan could 
reckon with an income of $365-$730 a year (about $550, on average).19   
Thus his opium using habit (estimated at around 1 kg per year) would have cost 
him about 7% of his salary, or less if he had direct access to opium production.  “By mid 
2002, however, opium prices fluctuated at around $400 a kg, i.e. about three quarters of 
average annual legal income (and for some Afghans less than their total annual 
income).”20  It is obvious that unless such an opium using person either gives up his habit 
or gains direct access to opium production, the only short-term “solution” for him is to 
commit theft and other illegal activities.  If the higher prices are maintained, this should 
                                                 
16 Roston, Aram.  “Central Asia’s Heroin Problem.” The Nation, 25 March 2002, p. 24. 
17 Ibid, p. 24. 
18 McDermott, Roger N., “Border Security in Tajikistan:  Countering the Narcotics Trade?” Conflict 
Studies Research Center, October 2002, p. 9. 
19 Chawla, Sandeep, Thomas Pietschmann, Thibault le Pichon, Aruna Nathwani, Johny Thomas, and 
Melissa Tullis.  “The Opium Economy in Afghanistan.” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New 
York, 2003, p. 76. 
20 Ibid, p. 76. 
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help to reduce the incidence rate, i.e. the number of new drug recruits entering the 
market, and thus drug related crime as well. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Opium Prices – Trend in Afghanistan (2000-2002)21 
As one can see, the economics of drug trade are having a serious effect on both 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan.  The value of opium as compared with other resources cannot 
be matched.  The devastation drug trafficking has on a society is clearly evident in the 
two countries studied.  The lucrative nature of the business is causing crime and 
corruption that is stopping the two societies from moving forward.  Next, the profits of 
drug trade will be looked at to understand the why people in the region are involved in 
this illegal activity. 
D. PROFITS 
With regard to Central Asia the ‘typical trafficking profits’ are derived from 
purchasing opium and heroin in Tajikistan, in the border areas with northern Afghanistan,                                                  
21 Chawla, et al., p. 61. 
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and selling the opium within Central Asia and the heroin in the Russian Federation. 
While the profits made from opium trafficking are minimal, gross profits made by 
shipping heroin to Moscow and selling it there is huge.  Intelligence information as well 
as arrest statistics indeed show a very strong involvement of criminal groups of Central 
Asian origin in this trade: “92% of drug smugglers arrested at Russia’s borders in 1999 
had a Central Asian background; 75% were Tajiks, 9% Uzbeks, 4% Kazakhs, 3% from 
Kyrgyzstan and 1% were from Turkmenistan.”22 “Based on an average price of more 
than $33,000 per kilogram, the gross profits to be made by criminal groups in Central 
Asia are likely to exceed $2 billion a year, and are thus higher than the gross profits made 
by criminal Iranian or Pakistani groups.”23  Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the 
calculations suggest that the gross trafficking profits made in Central Asia are equivalent 
to 7% of the region’s aggregate GDP, and constitute an even significantly higher 
percentage for countries with a small GDP, such as Tajikistan.   
The overall income from trafficking in opiates in countries neighboring 
Afghanistan can be estimated at around US$ 4 billion.  This is equivalent 
to 2% of the aggregated GDP of the countries neighboring Afghanistan.24  
Opiate prices fluctuate in the region for numerous reasons:  demand, production, 
eradication, interdiction, and greed.  It was discovered that the lower prices made opiates 
affordable to ever-larger sections of society.  In Tajikistan, for instance, heroin prices 
were reported to have declined to such an extent that the price for a shot of heroin was 
about the same as a bottle of beer.  The reaction of consumers to falling drug prices, 
measured in Central Asia through official registration systems (usually based on 
treatment) tend to show abuse trends with some delay.  Thus the strong declines of prices 
in Tajikistan, for instance, only led to a rapid rise in the number of registered drug 
abusers two years later.  Moreover, the rapid increase in the number of registered drug 
abusers continued even though the decline in prices became less pronounced in 
subsequent years.25 
                                                 
22 Chawla, et al., p. 192. 
23 Ibid, p. 192. 
24 Ibid, p. 192. 
25 Drug abuse will be talked about in greater detail in the next section.  The following example is used 
to show the impact of drug abuse and the economic impact it is having on society. 
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Estimation of the likely magnitudes of funds generated from trafficking revealed 
that the largest profits among Afghanistan’s neighbors are apparently being made in 
Central Asia:  
$2.2 billion, equivalent to 7% of GDP.  Gross trafficking profits in Iran 
were estimated to range from $1 to $1.3 billion, equivalent to 1% to 1.3% 
of GDP.  Gross profits for Pakistan were conservatively estimated at $400 
million, equivalent to 0.7% of GDP, but could go up to 800 million or 
1.3% of GDP.26  
In total about $4 billion is generated from drug trafficking in countries 
neighboring Afghanistan.  In contrast to the popular perception that an inflow of such 
funds must be positive for an economy, the opposite seems to be true.  Funds as large as 
these, in criminal hands, obviously destabilize the state, civil society as well as the 
economy.  The smaller countries of Central Asia are particularly vulnerable in this 
regard.  Corruption, violence and ‘dirty money’, including financial support for terrorist 
organizations, have negative repercussions for legitimate investment and thus 
compromise economic growth in the long run. 
Profits from drug trafficking will continue the drug trade throughout the region.  
The continuing shift of the drug trade from the other regions of Afghanistan to the north 
is clearly evident.  Profits determine the route and clearly the profits being made from 
trafficking through Central Asia (in particular Tajikistan) is making headlines.  The 
fluctuation in prices of drugs is not having as large an impact to the Central Asian route 
due to the ease of transporting drugs across the border and the lack of seizures. 
E. DRUG USE 
The strongest increases in opiate abuse have, in recent years, taken place in the 
countries of Central Asia.  The increases can be linked to the northern route for 
trafficking opiates from Afghanistan to the Russian Federation, and other countries.  The 
number of drug users registered with the health authorities showed an exponential 
growth, more than tripling between 1992 and 2000.  If the 1990-2000 period is 
considered, available data show a six-fold increase.  In contrast to Iran, drug abuse in the 
Central Asia region is, in general largely linked to abuse of heroin.  In the five Central 
                                                 
26 Chawla, et al., p. 203. 
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Asian countries studied, opiate use, mostly intravenously administered heroin, appears to 
be even more widespread than cannabis use, the traditional drug of choice in the region.  
 
Figure 2.   Opiate Abuse per region (2000/2001)27 
Based on the number of registered drug abusers, Tajikistan showed a seven-fold 
increase of drug abuse over the 1992-2000 period (28% per year).28  This went in parallel 
with dramatically increasing levels of trafficking.  The other Central Asian countries 
reported a tripling in the number of registered drug abusers over the same period, 
“equivalent to an average annual growth rate of 16% to 17%.”29 
Considering the proportions of people in treatment for opiate abuse it can be 
estimated that about 0.6% of the total population or 0.9% of the population age 15 and 
above in Central Asia consume opiates.30  This is three times the corresponding ratio for 
Western Europe.  However, if the prevalence estimates are compared to the size of the 
                                                 
27 Ibid, p. 169.  Note:  Figure 2 shows the large increase in opiate abuse in neighboring Central Asia, 
Russia and Eastern Europe.  
28 Ibid, p. 185. 
29 Ibid, p. 185. 
30 Ibid, p. 190. 
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population age 15 and above “the second highest rate among the Central Asian countries 
is in Tajikistan (1.2%), ahead of Kazakhstan (1.1%).”31  This reversal in the ranking is a 
reflection of the higher proportion of the population under the age of 15 in Tajikistan as 
compared to Kazakhstan.   
Given high levels of unemployment in the country, productivity losses due to 
drug abuse have not played much of a role either.  There was still more than sufficient 
labor available in the country.  In short, while the social aspect of drug abuse is 
important, the economic impact of drug abuse has not yet reached any critical orders of 
magnitude.  The economic impact could, however, become far more serious as refugees 
return to Afghanistan.  According to sources “more than 1.3 million Afghan refugees 
were repatriated to Afghanistan over the March-June 2002 period, of which 1.2 million 
returned from Pakistan, 100,000 from Iran and 10,000 from Central Asia.”32  It is likely 
that a significant number of these refugees have a drug problem.  Apart from less money 
available for essentials, there will also be less money available to take advantage of 
development opportunities.  A number of cases have already been reported where refugee 
repatriation grants were simply used to buy drugs. 
Therefore, countries neighboring Afghanistan will suffer some time to come from 
the consequences of Afghanistan’s opium bumper harvests.  The reaction to rising drug 
prices is slower than to falling drug prices, because once a drug epidemic has started, it 
tends to fuel itself for a considerable period of time.  Drug users, in order to finance their 
habit, become increasingly engaged in local drug trafficking activities, over time 
contributing to a further spread of drug abuse, even though drug prices may already have 
started to rise.  Tajikistan, which showed the strongest increases in the abuse rates in 
recent years, is particularly vulnerable to further rises in drug abuse.  Treatment could 
help to break the vicious circle.  However, treatment is rather expensive for countries that 
have only very limited funds at their disposal.33 
 
                                                 
31 Chawla, et al., p. 190. 
32 Ibid, p. 150. 
33 Discussion of possible solutions to Tajikistan/Afghanistan’s drug trafficking dilemma will be 
provided in the conclusion. 
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F. DRUG ADDICTION AND HIV/AIDS  
It is difficult for any country to determine the extent and nature of drug use and 
for that matter the extent of HIV/AIDS.  In the case of Tajikistan, the lack of an 
established, effective mechanism for discovering drug addicts and establishing records on 
them, as well as the lack of legislation regulating drug treatment, make it impossible to 
determine the precise number of drug users and people suffering from addiction.  There is 
a high degree of hidden drug use and addiction due to fear of prosecution or repressive 
measures by law enforcement agencies.  
Studies have been conducted to examine the link between drug trafficking routes 
in Central Asia and the outbreaks of HIV.  This is accomplished by using molecular sub-
typing of HIV to track different strains of HIV in infected people living along drug 
routes.  Sub-typing involves isolating the HIV virus from the blood of infected people 
and sequencing the DNA of the virus.  By mapping out where the subtypes are found 
geographically as well as the risk factors of those infected with the specific subtypes, it is 
possible to create an accurate picture of where HIV has entered a population and how it is 
moving.34 
Through the use of sub-typing and studies on HIV/AIDS it is quite significant that 
Central Asia is a trafficking route, as there are distinct differences in heroin use and 
subsequent HIV epidemics along the heroin supply continuum.  It begins in the 
production zones, follows trafficking routes and ends in destination markets.  In 
production zones, such as Afghanistan, there is an abundance of opium, making it 
accessible and inexpensive.  Most users in these areas smoke the opium, with a minority 
snorting it.  Neither of these methods present a direct risk for HIV.  As a person 
progresses along drug trafficking routes, opium is less abundant.  The further away from 
the source one goes, the more expensive pure heroin becomes (handlers along the way 
add on their fees).  Many people begin by smoking the heroin, then transition to injection.  
Once the heroin reaches the destination markets, users almost immediately begin 
injecting, as smoking is neither economical nor effective to become high, as the drug has 
been cut so much that it must be injected for the desired effect. 
                                                 
34 Frantz, Douglas.  “Drug Use Begetting AIDS in Central Asia,” The New York Times, 05 August 
2001, p. 34. 
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  AIDS first appeared in Central Asia in Kazakstan’s Karaganda area at the end of 
the 1980’s.  Since then that area has seen a near epidemic among the intravenous user 
community.35 Part of the reason for the infection spread so rapidly was ignorance.  Until 
the mid-1990’s many people have not even heard of the disease.  It is believed in 2000 
that 85 percent of those testing positive for HIV had become infected through sharing 
needles.36 The highest numbers of cases have been reported in the city of Termitau in 
Karaganda.  The city is a main transit point for drugs traveling through Kazakhstan to 
Russia.  “Over 1,000 people there have contracted the infection, slightly less than 
epidemic proportion, which is defined as infection of one percent of a population.”37 
In Tajikistan the healthcare system is in dismal condition and heavily dependent 
upon international assistance.   
Government spending has decreased dramatically over the past decade, 
and only 5 percent of the GDP was spent on health in 1998.  In addition, 
the average healthcare worker’s salary had fallen to under U.S.$5 per 
month in 1998, contributing to a large-scale exodus.38   
Those who remain are not the always the best qualified.  Healthcare is free of 
charge but it has been de facto privatized because the dismally low investment and 
salaries have created an informal payment system.  Patients must not only supplement 
doctor’s income and pay for his or her service, they must also purchase all drugs, some 
equipment, provide meals and nursing care.  Since all services must be paid for, primacy 
healthcare is out of the question for most families.  The result of this collapsing system 
has been a resurgence of diseases once eradicated in Tajikistan.  Typhoid, malaria, 
tuberculosis, syphilis, malnutrition and water-borne diseases are just a few of those now 
proliferating.39 
A new challenge for Tajikistan comes from HIV/AIDS.  There are less than 100 
registered AIDS cases but in reality the problem is probably much worse; unofficial 
                                                 
35 “Kazakhstan:  Up to 200,000 Drug Users Have Few Places to Turn to for Treatment,” Eurasianet, 
21 December 2000, p. 3. 
36 Ibid, p. 2. 
37 Ian MacKinnon and Adam Piore, “The Other AIDS Crisis,” Newsweek, 11 June 2001, p. 56. 
38 ICG, p. 17. 
39 Ibid, p. 17. 
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estimates are over 2,000.  Between 750 and 1,000 HIV positive cases were registered in 
2000 and 2001, pointing to a rapid upward trend.40  Insufficient testing and fear of social 
repercussions have meant that many people at risk are simply not tested.  Injecting drug 
users are the most at-risk, and as drug abuse is increasing rapidly, it is expected that the 
incidence of HIV will grow in tandem, but sexual transmission of HIV is also escalating. 
The HIV/AIDS growth rate is of particular concern for Central Asia and countries 
along the trafficking routes.  These countries, especially Tajikistan, cannot turn a blind 
eye to the problems that arise from IDU’s.  It is imperative that these countries receive 
the needed help to stop this drug trade as the northern route becomes more popular.  
Focus needs to be turned towards outside countries for help.  Russia and the United States 
need to interdict and eradicate this dilemma. 
G. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 
Russia and the United States have limited influence within the Central Asian and 
Afghanistan region when it comes to drug trafficking.  Russia has maintained its border 
troops within Tajikistan after the break up of the USSR in 1991.  This is primarily due to 
the instability that was apparent in the country at that time.  On 23 September 1992 the 
FPS Border Group was officially set up in Tajikistan and on 25 May 1993 a bilateral 
agreement between Russia and Tajikistan was signed that gives the authority for the 
protection of the Tajik border to the FPS.41 Originally this agreement was intended only 
to serve as an interim measure until the city of Dushanbe could construct and sufficiently 
strengthen its own border guard to protect its borders.  The border group of the FPS 
stationed in Tajikistan is quite unique as a military formation, with “7% of its officers, 
nearly 50% of the warrant officers, 69% of contract servicemen and 99% of conscripts 
are Tajik citizens.”42 The rest of the personnel in the FPS are Russian.43 Unfortunately, 
Russia wants to pull its troops out of the region and turn it back over to Tajikistan.  
Tajikistan is not able to patrol its border without outside help due to lack of training, 
equipment and personnel.                                                  
40 Ibid, p. 18. 
41 McDermott, Roger N., Border Security in Tajikistan:  Countering the Narcotics Trade?, p. 4. 
42 Ibid, p. 5. 
43 Chapter IV will focus on the border dilemma facing Tajikistan with its neighbors.  The following 
example is used to describe the limited influence Russia has with Tajikistan. 
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Russia should be more concerned with the drug trafficking dilemma than it is at 
the present time. “The decline in the birthrate and the rise in the death rate have proved a 
devastating combination:  Russia appears to be the first country in history to experience 
such a sharp decrease in births versus deaths for reasons other than war, famine, or 
disease.”44  
Between January 1, 1987 (when the AIDS virus first appeared in the 
Soviet Union) and December 31, 2000, 83,054 individuals were diagnosed 
as HIV positive.  In 2001 the number of registered cases doubled, reaching 
177,354.45   
On August 6, 2002, Vadim Pokrovskii, head of the Federal Center for the 
Prevention and Treatment of HIV/AIDS (the AIDS Center), “put the figure for registered 
HIV-positive citizens at 206,000.”46  But the figure for those “registered” with the state is 
misleading.  Experts acknowledge that to determine the actual number of HIV-positive 
individuals, some sort of multiplier—suggestions cluster around 6 to 10—must be used, 
since those most likely to become infected avoid contact with the authorities.47 
In particular, IDUs evade testing since they can be arrested simply for using 
drugs.  WHO says the “true number” of Russian infections is 7 to 10 times the figure for 
those officially registered.  In July 2002, “when reporting that 205,000 cases of HIV had 
been registered, Pokrovskii added that the total number infected ‘could be eight to ten 
times higher.’”48 
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Figure 3.   Russia – IDU-related HIV cases in 200149 
Additionally, Russia has the world’s highest rate of growth for new HIV cases 
although the rate allegedly is declining.   
Between 1996 and 2001, the number of new infections increased on 
average by 2.4 times annually.  In January 2001, Pokrovskii predicted that 
2 million cases would occur by the end of the year; by 2005, he suggested, 
the total could reach 5 million (although more recently, he indicated that 
the “5 million” figure might not be reached until 2007).50  
It is unclear whether the slowdown is real or the authorities are underreporting 
new cases.  In any case, Russia is facing a great dilemma and with the drug trafficking 
routes from Central Asia (in particular from Tajikistan through Kazakhstan and into 
Russia).  The increase in intravenous drug users is creating a harsh reality for Russia.  
Their population is declining. 
                                                 
49 Chawla, et al., p. 202.  Note:  Figure 2 displays the vast amount of HIV related infections in 2001.  
Central Asia is rising as the figure portrays and the rates beyond 2001 are even greater. 
50 Ibid, p. 347. 
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As for the United States, it does not receive a great quantity of opium, heroin, or 
morphine from Afghanistan and the Central Asian region.  As a result, the United States 
provides minimal funding for the drug trade from Afghanistan into the neighboring 
regions.  One of the top reasons why the United States is not as involved is because it 
does not receive the majority of its drugs (in particular heroin) from the Asian states.   
The United States entered the Central Asian region following the attacks on 9/11.  
“The US government has acquired basing or transit rights for passage of warplanes and 
military supplies from nearly two dozen countries in Central Asia, the Middle East and 
their periphery, a projection of American power in the center of the Eurasian land mass 
that has no historical precedent.”51 Both American and Russian combat forces are now 
stationed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  Russian President Vladimir Putin has publicly 
supported the deployment of American troops on the territory of the former Soviet Union.  
Unfortunately, he wants their stay to be brief and to move on once the mission in the 
region is completed.   
Why has the United States not focused attention on the drug trade in the region?  
On August 15, 2003, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield said that “opium 
production in Afghanistan has gone up since the fall of the Taliban regime and he does 
not know how to curb it.”52 Additionally he stated, “And you ask what we are going to 
do, and the answer is, I don’t really know…I think it’s an awfully tough problem.”53 Mr. 
Rumsfield said the Afghan heroin was a bigger problem for Europe and Russia rather 
than the US because it’s mainly smuggled to the European nations.  He said Britain has 
taken the lead in trying to curb the production of opium, which is used for making heroin, 
in Afghanistan because “they have the greatest concern about it…The United States has 
offered to help the UK.” 54 He does not want the “over-stretched 8,000 US soldiers in 
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Afghanistan to become sidetracked from their main goal:  to capture and kill terrorists.  
And chasing drug smugglers could take away allies from the Americans.”55  
Unfortunately, Britain has their hands full and they are not making good progress.  
“British-led plans to destroy Afghan opium poppy farming, responsible for 90% of the 
UK’s heroin supply, have made little progress so far, UN figures will show next 
month.”56 Britain, who is responsible for the international coordination of the fight 
against the Afghan drug trade, is “to call a donors’ conference to raise extra funds to 
combat the Afghan economy’s dependence on opium production.”57 The conference will 
also examine alternative livelihoods for desperately poor farmers attracted to the 
profitable opium market.  The conference, which will most likely be held in Afghanistan, 
will bring the major agencies together including the UN, the Aid Development Bank, the 
World Bank and the European Union, as well as, individual countries.  Britain has 
already provided “nearly 300m pounds to Afghanistan over three years, including 70m 
pounds just to fight drugs.”58 United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair has even 
appealed to the Russians to help fight the international drugs trade, which he fears has 
become a major source of funds for terrorists.  Mr. Blair told the EU-Russian summit in 
St Petersburg “that the international drugs trade was increasingly related to terrorism and 
the risk that terrorists might get their hands on weapons of mass destruction.”59   
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The drug trade has and is continuing to plague Afghanistan and Tajikistan due to 
the difficulties each country is having politically, economically and community wide.  
Steps are being taken to try and alleviate the problems being faced by the regions, but 
progress is slow (if any).  As for Tajikistan, they have been able to stabilize their 
government somewhat since the civil unrest they faced between 1992 and 1997.  Political 
stability and economic growth was at the forefront of revisionist planning for creating a 
sound state.  Government restructure has been progressing along steadily and Tajikistan 
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has seen and continues to see a 7 percent annual increase in GDP since the Civil War.60 
Unfortunately, several matters remain untouched or are in need of attention and these 
factors are keeping Tajikistan from being able to escape economic frustrations. 
So how has Tajikistan experienced such a strong growth with increases in GDP 
averaging 7 percent annually since the end of the civil war in 1997?  Much of this growth 
has been based on the recovery of traditional exports like aluminum and cotton.  There 
are signs that light manufacturing and private farming are also expanding.  The strong 
growth in recent years will only be sustained if structural reform is accelerated.  Until 
now, “structural reform has been erratic due to narrow base of ownership, weak 
institutions, uneven political support, inexperience, and a reform agenda that was perhaps 
too ambitious for the immediate post-civil war period.”61  Given the important link 
between structural reform and economic growth, Tajikistan’s program places great 
weight on strong structural policies.   
There are major challenges facing Tajikistan’s economic reform process, which 
are, “(a) enhancing stabilization through better implementation of fiscal and monetary 
policy; (b) achieving more extensive ownership of core structural reforms; and (c) 
restructuring debt and improving debt management.”62 Progress in these areas will be 
supported by a proposed three-year poverty reduction arrangement that is being 
requested. 
Tajikistan’s history and geography have made its internal policies particularly 
sensitive to foreign relations.  “Afghanistan continues to cast a pall of uncertainty over 
the future, representing both opportunity (increased trade possibilities) and threats (drugs, 
a resurgence of violence south of the border).”63  The increased U.S. presence in Central 
Asia and Afghanistan is also having an impact, as the government feels more secure in 
diversifying its foreign policy, particularly away from Russia.  Nevertheless, Russia 
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retains considerable influence, primarily through its troops and border guards present in 
the country, but also because Tajikistan is economically dependent, particularly its 
informal economy.  In financial terms, international institutions are becoming much more 
important than Russia, which is unable or unwilling to offer funding.  This competition 
for influence will also have an impact on development.  The United States and Russia 
need to collaborate with other nations to stop the increase in drug trafficking across the 
Tajikistan/Afghanistan border.   
This chapter discussed why drug trafficking has shifted to Tajikistan, the 
economics involved, the effects of drug production and trafficking and why the United 
States and Russia should concern themselves with the problems.  Chapter III will show 
why the Afghanistan-Tajikistan cross-border trafficking is center of gravity.  
Additionally, it will analyze the trafficking groups and routes in Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan.  Chapter IV will examine the strategies and capacities of the border agencies 
and how they fall short.  Chapter V will offer policy recommendations and conclusions.   
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III. TRAFFICKING ROUTES AND GROUPS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Geography and history make Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan attractive areas for drug traffic.  These states are situated between the 
world’s largest illicit opium producers and the most lucrative markets in Western Europe.  
The countries borders are located in close proximity to “the countries of the Golden 
Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran), and, via China, have access to the countries of 
the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand), which are the world’s largest 
producers of illicit opiates.”64  
The conditions of the breakup of the Soviet Union created a natural camouflage 
that worked to the drug dealers’ advantage.  The region was an untapped market and an 
enormous attraction for traders from throughout the world.  “In the early 1990’s goods 
coming to Europe from the former Soviet Union were not looked upon as suspicious and 
were not subjected to rigorous inspections at their European destinations, while those 
coming from Southwest Asia were usually suspected of narcotics contraband and were 
thoroughly checked.”65  The fact that all of the countries of the region are members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was an added benefit.  Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are members of the Central Asian 
Economic Community.  “Though most of these organizations are largely just ‘de jure’ 
creations, they still make drug trafficking easier by, for example, maintaining a visa-free 
travel regime for the citizens of the CIS countries, as well as by having various bilateral 
agreements that facilitate free trade between countries.”66  
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The history and geography pre-determined a “flood of drugs into the region, and 
between 1992 and 1996 opium transportation through the region increased 13.5 times.”67 
It is two-way traffic with opium, morphine, heroin, and cannabis going to Europe, and 
precursors and synthetic drugs flowing back.  Today, drug trafficking is reaching all time 
levels and Afghanistan and Central Asia have a strong market for supplying the West. 
This chapter will establish why the Afghanistan-Tajikistan cross-border 
trafficking is the center of gravity and then analyze trafficking groups and routes in 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
B. DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS 
The ongoing process of globalization only exacerbates many of the problems 
associated with drug trade.  Improved communication has increased human mobility and 
has spread the pattern of drugs to other regions.  There is a tendency for drug dealers and 
traffickers in various countries to unite to create transnational crime organizations and 
divide up the territory.  Now researchers are seeing that the number of criminal groups 
involved in drug trafficking is on the rise.   
In 1998 Kyrgyzstan had 64 drug trafficking crime groups.  During the first 
three months of 1999 law enforcement agents had already discovered 35 
similar groups.68  
The Kazakh Security Committee identified 125 organized crime groups operating 
in Central Asia, 30 of which were involved in drug trafficking in Kazakhstan alone.69 
The following examples will display many of the difficulties affecting each one of 
the Central Asian states.  First, organized drug groups, such as Tajikistan’s Islamic 
opposition and Pamiri population, prey on weaknesses within government institutions 
and work towards further destabilizing the situation to make drug trafficking easier and to 
scare off international observers and advisors.  They provide funds for warring factions in 
internal conflicts, Islamic opposition groups, and terrorist groups.  They also corrupt 
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governments and undermine the social fabric by involving women and children in 
dangerous trafficking activities. 
Just like in neighboring Afghanistan, it appears that warring factions in Tajikistan 
have turned to drug trafficking to raise money to finance their military campaigns.  In 
particular, Uzbek opposition groups that were pushed out of Tajikistan as part of the 
reconciliation process, most predominantly those led by Djuma Namangani, have now 
taken refuge in Kyrgyzstan, pulling the southern and mountainous part of their country in 
to the whirlwind of drug-related and other criminal activity.70 “Djuma Namagani controls 
about 70 percent of the drugs moving via the northern route.”71   
The radical Islamic groups in Uzbekistan are fronts for drug rings.  Law 
enforcement officers may plant drugs on the person or property of political opponents or 
religious figures and then prosecute them on trumped-up drug charges.  The courts rarely 
challenge police accounts or forced confessions, particularly in trials with political 
repercussions.  The crackdown on the Islamic Movement Uzbekistan (IMU) has made 
use of these tactics to increase sentences since drug trafficking carries some of the most 
severe penalties, including death.72 
Numerous opposition Islamic groups have controlled Tajikistan’s Badakshan 
region.  This mountainous region encompasses about 40 percent of Tajikistan’s territory 
and is ill suited to both agriculture and industry.73  The region also has the lowest 
absolute population density in the country, “with 3.2 people per square kilometer.”74 
International drug traders could not find a more hospitable economic situation.   
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Another group in the Central Asian region, predominately in Tajikistan, is the 
Lesha Gorbaty’s Group.75 They have spread themselves throughout the region and made 
it a lifestyle for drug trafficking.  The group’s leader was killed four years ago in a bomb 
explosion, but the Lesha Gorbaty Group continues drug trafficking from Afghanistan and 
transports the goods throughout the Central Asian region. 
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Albanian drug barons who control “the 
Balkan route” of drug trafficking in Europe are also very interested with the drug 
trafficking that occurs in Central Asia.76  Both organizations want to ensure that trade 
routes remain open in order to keep money and arms coming into their country.  
Additionally, Iranian drug lords are very interested in drug trafficking from Afghanistan 
and Central Asia.  One particular drug lord, Hajj Ghulam Baloch, has spent years 
financing warring Afghanistan factions.77  
Similarly, it has been reported that Osama bin-Laden financed his terrorist 
activities with profits from his opium syndicate that operated from western Afghanistan.  
It has also been reported that he considered opium a powerful weapon in the Jihad (Holy 
War).  Indian intelligence agencies reported that bin Laden controlled about “60 illegal 
heroin laboratories.”78 
Whether or not bin Laden was directly involved in drug trafficking is less 
important than the fact that the drug industry was and is an important outlet for organized 
crime in the region.  When there is a demand there will always be a supply.  Due to the 
fact that there are so many organized crime units and drug trafficking organizations 
within the region, it is no wonder that corruption plagued many of the countries.  
Similarly, according to Interpol, the drug mafia controls governments of at least 12 
countries.79  Five of the twelve are active in the Central Asian region.  In addition, Russia 
is becoming increasingly concerned about drugs being delivered to its territory by mafia 
groups from Central Asia and the Caucasus and now realizes that they are part of the 
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loop.  Additionally, Afghan groups, in general, do not appear to participate in lucrative 
international drug trafficking operations.  The involvement of Afghan groups/individuals 
is basically limited to the opium production, the trade of opium within Afghanistan, the 
transformation of some of the opium into morphine and heroin, and to some extent, the 
trafficking of opiates (opium, morphine, heroin) to neighboring countries (Iran, Pakistan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).  
In recent years women have been getting more and more actively involved in drug 
trafficking in Tajikistan.  Official statistics indicate,  
That whereas in 1993, of those people found to have committed crimes 
involving drug dealing, 29 were women, in 1998 this number had 
increased to 114.  The number of men committing crimes during this 
period doubled, while the number of women in the same category 
quadrupled.80  
Since 1996 the share of women in drug trafficking has increased from “3 percent 
to 12.2 percent in Kazakhstan; women constituted 35 percent of those convicted of drug 
crimes in 1998 in Tajikistan and 12.4 percent in Kyrgyzstan.”81  In 1999 the data on 
women’s increasing involvement in drug trafficking grew even worse.  According to data 
from the “Information Department of the Tajikistan Internal Affairs Ministry regarding 
criminal cases which were brought to completion, in 1997, 63 women were the objects of 
criminal prosecution, in 1998, 83 women, and in 1999, 177 women.”82 Although the 
proportion of women involved in smuggling is still small, and their growth rate relatively 
modest, Tajik television and the press in particular have focused on the involvement of 
women in drug trafficking. 
An inquiry into the reasons why women get involved in drug trafficking finds that 
the majority of women commit drug trafficking crimes because they are/were in dire 
economic straits and that they wanted to make “big” money.  Also, many of those women 
in Tajikistan are war widows with multiple children and no legitimate means of earning a 
living.  Additionally, women will usually accept less pay for their courier services.  “But 
some husbands reportedly also push their second or third wives to become traffickers to 
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better provide for the family; some women are ‘conned’ by more seasoned traffickers; 
and some women find their children kidnapped until they agree to carry narcotics from 
one location to another.”83 
Women are recruited or forced into drug trafficking for many reasons.  In case of 
arrest they are less likely to give up their supplies because of a stronger desire to protect 
families, and they are more likely to get shorter sentences due to the courts’ general 
leniency toward women, particularly toward those with children.  Also, “women are set 
up to be caught as the ‘cover up,’ or ‘shirma,’ allowing customs officials to look the other 
way and let the ‘big fish’ continue unhampered.”84 With corruption and collusion 
widespread between customs officials and drug traffickers, customs officials are 
sometimes informed beforehand who to search so that the traffickers carrying large 
amounts of drugs can pass through without detection. 
People in Central Asia also worry about consequences of the drug trade on family 
life and traditional communities.  Trafficking involving children is becoming a growing 
concern.  There has been evidence of fathers attempting to hide heroin in children’s shoes 
and the “discovery of three kilos of opium tied to the thighs of three children, ages 9 to 
13, traveling with their mother.”85 Drug trafficking involving children has grown 
dramatically. 
C. DRUG CULTIVATION AND TRAFFICKING ROUTES - AFGHANISTAN 
Why are Afghanistan and Central Asia playing such a major role in the growing 
and exporting of opium and heroin?  This section shows why drug production in the 
region has been able to flourish and why there are so many routes that drug traffickers 
take.   
Trafficking patterns need to be analyzed in order to understand the various 
trafficking routes that traders use.  An obvious finding concerns the massive extent to 
which countries neighboring Afghanistan (Iran, Pakistan and the countries of Central 
Asia) are affected by drug trafficking activities.   
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In 2000 the ‘neighboring countries’ of Afghanistan were responsible for 
61% of global seizures of opiates.  Taking all the opiate seizures of the 
regions that are strongly affected by Afghanistan’s opium production, i.e. 
Europe, the Near & Middle East and Central Asia, the ‘neighboring 
countries’ of Afghanistan accounted for 71% of the opiate seizures in 
these three regions in 2000.86   
By comparison, the ‘neighboring countries’ accounted in 2000 for 22% of the 
population of the three regions or just 1% of the aggregated GDP of these three regions, 
clearly indicating the economic burden put on these countries by drug trafficking.87  
In 2001, “56% of total opiate seizures in Afghanistan’s neighboring countries 
were made by Iran, followed by Pakistan (28%).”88  In recent years the Central Asian 
countries, in particular Tajikistan where the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
has developed a special-purpose project, reported the biggest increase in seizures.  There 
is also evidence of increased heroin manufacture within Afghanistan, reflected in heroin 
seizures in neighboring countries.  
In 2002 the largest gross profits from trafficking were made by criminal groups 
from Central Asia ($2.2 billion, equivalent to 7% of the area’s GDP). Gross trafficking 
profits in Iran were estimated at $1 to $1.3 billion, equivalent to 1% to 1.3% of GDP. For 
Pakistan, they were estimated at $400 to $800 million, equivalent to 0.7% to 1.3% of 
GDP.89 
An exploration of the Afghanistan region is necessary in order to see how easily it 
is to grow, cultivate and transport opium to out-lying areas.  Afghanistan is known for its 
vast terrain that goes from low-lying valleys to high mountain ranges.  River systems 
throughout the region provide a means for drug producers to irrigate their crops.  
Afghanistan has many mountain rivers that provide the water necessary to grow opium.  
A couple of rivers in Afghanistan, the Pyandzh and the Kunduz are famous for opium 
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cultivation and trafficking.  It is possible to grow and cultivate opium in the mountains 
and valleys of Afghanistan due to the vast amount of farmers and lack of government 
control over the crops they produce.   
The northern portion of Afghanistan has and is becoming a major focal point of 
law enforcement personnel and drug fighting institutions due to the shift in the drug trade 
in this region.  Though this area is not as large as the southern portion of the country, its 
impact on drug trafficking is significant.  The northern Afghan border makes a long run 
through the mountainous region.  It is not feasible to build guard towers and footprint 
lines on this portion.  This region,  
Which includes Takhar and most of Badakhshan province, produces the 
biggest share of northern Afghanistan’s heroin.  Traffickers carry it into 
neighboring Kunduz, which consists predominantly of steppes and 
semiarid land.90   
People carry poppies to the river for cultivation; like wheat or barley, opium 
poppies require irrigation systems.  Villagers along the Kunduz River who used to trade 
cotton and sesame seeds with Pakistani wholesalers have begun growing and selling 
poppy. 
Poppy requires less effort in cultivation than grain and in Badakhshan, where a 
mountain foot serves as a border; the road crosses poppy fields as it climbs.  Any land on 
the mountain slope that promises any use for cultivation is ploughed up, seeded with 
poppy, and tilled.  Villagers have even moved soil and covered stones, using buffaloes 
and donkeys, to clear more land.  They distribute soil in a thick layer so that the stones 
are fully covered and poppy roots have enough space to grow.  When spring rains destroy 
this layer of fertile soil, farmers repeat the process for the next season.  Farmers say soil 
lasts two or three seasons, then must lie fallow for three or four years. 
Traditionally the bulk of opium poppy cultivation was in the south 
(Helmand province, 52% of total cultivation in 2000) and the east 
(Nangarhar, 24%).  In 2001, the Taliban ban pushed the output to the north 
(Badakshan, 83%, though of a far lower total). In 2002 the largest areas 
under cultivation were again Helmand (40%), Nangarhar (27%) and 
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Badakshan (11%), followed by Uruzgan (7%), Kandahar (5%), and Ghor 
(3%).91   
Thus 93% of the area under poppy cultivation is restricted to six provinces that 
have not yet complied with the ban issued by the Government in January 2002.92 
 
Figure 4.   Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation - 200293  
The area under poppy cultivation is a tiny fraction of the arable land in 
Afghanistan (when looking at the size of the state as compared to the area being 
cultivated).  Even in the poppy growing villages, “only 8% of the arable land was used 
for opium cultivation in 2000, though in Helmand and Nangarhar the rates were 
significantly higher (about one-third of arable land).”94  The northern provinces, which 
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are rain-fed and generally easy to cultivate, provide an easy avenue for drugs to reach 
their destination markets.  The southern portion of Afghanistan is still a very ideal 
location for poppy cultivation.  Even today the bulk of poppy cultivation takes place on 
irrigated land in the south, where productivity can be 3-4 times higher than in the rain-fed 
provinces of the north.  Statistics are showing that the northern provinces are growing at a 
faster rate than the south and trends will continue as long as the drug mafia has access to 
trafficking routes to sell their drugs. 
Northern Afghanistan has also become an important location for stocks of opiates 
in recent years.  Price patterns and intelligence reports agree that this is the case.  “In 
2001 opium prices were temporarily lower in the border regions between Badakhshan 
and Tajikistan than the average prices that farmers in other parts of Badakhshan could 
obtain for selling their fresh opium.”95  This can only be explained by the existence of 
important stocks in the border region.  In 2001, Tajik villagers emerged as the main 
producers of opiates in Afghanistan.  Once in Tajikistan, opiates are usually trafficked on 
to other Central Asian countries, as well as, to several towns of the Russian Federation 
and other CIS countries, often by rail and often organized by criminal Tajik groups in 
Tajikistan or other CIS countries. 
Due to the rapid increase in poppy growth and production, it is estimated that 
there are “61 other heroin factories in northern Afghanistan that produce the deadly 
narcotic…they operate with the compliance, and possibly the protection, of the warlords 
the US-led bombing campaign helped bring to power.”96 Regional drug control officials 
say the war on terror has not only failed to destroy the illegal narcotics trade, it “has 
inadvertently helped restore it to the levels that preceded the Taliban’s ban on poppy 
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D. MARKETS  
Over the last twenty years (1980-2000) Afghanistan’s opium markets were 
somewhat fragmented.  The weakness of the central administration, the country’s 
segmentation into clans and tribes, and the poor transport infrastructure splintered the 
trade.  “Domestic markets were also affected by cross-border trafficking: conditions in 
neighboring countries (prices, routes and risks) shaped Afghanistan’s own terms of trade 
and trading structures.”98  
In eastern markets (Nangarhar province), prices tended to be higher than in the 
south due to an oligopolistic market structure.  Southern markets were decentralized, 
atomistic and highly competitive, with lower prices.  In the north, opium prices were 
typically high because of better quality and strongly rising demand in Central Asia and 
Russia.  “In recent years (2000-2002) price differentials have, however, declined: 
Afghanistan’s fragmented opium trade, now increasingly influenced by international 
syndicates and criminal groups, may be on the way to becoming a single integrated 
market.”99 
E. CENTRAL ASIAN ROUTES - TAJIKISTAN 
It is now necessary to look at the Central Asian drug trafficking routes in detail to 
discuss the extent of routes throughout this region.  The smaller countries of Central Asia 
have been particularly vulnerable to criminal organizations and the influx of drug 
trafficking throughout the region.  Drug trafficking routes have been spreading 
throughout the region for over a decade now and affects can be seen in each one of the 
five countries.  Corruption, violence and dirty money, which include financial support for 
terrorist organizations, have had negative repercussions for legitimate governments and 
investment.  Therefore, each one of the countries has a weak political and economic 
structure.  Drug barons and criminal organizations take advantage of these situations and 
utilize weaknesses to create their strengths.  Particular emphasis will be placed on 
Tajikistan and the numerous supply lines throughout their region. 
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The new drug trade made its strongest initial routes into Tajikistan, where the 
situation was exacerbated by civil war between 1992-97.  Tajikistan is still recovering 
from its civil war, which left much of the country’s already impoverished economy in 
ruins.  Part of the Tajik population fled the fighting into Afghanistan, thus indirectly 
facilitating development of new transport networks.  By 1996, when the Taliban took 
control of most of Afghanistan, there were numerous poppy fields in that country and 
well established drug routes throughout.  The combination of its long border with 
Afghanistan and its barely functioning economy has made it the main gateway into 
Central Asia, Russia, Eastern and Western Europe for Afghan opium and heroin.   
Countries of Central Asia only started to report significant seizures as of the late 
1990s.  A strong increase and a clear concentration of seizures among the countries of 
Central Asia has been found in Tajikistan, reflecting increased trafficking from 
Afghanistan to the north, as well as improvements of the enforcement capacity of 
Tajikistan in recent years.   
Some 60% of all Afghan drugs entering Tajikistan are trafficked across 
the flat terrain of the Afghan-Tajik border (via Pynaj, Moskowsky, Nizhni 
Pyanj, Shuruabad, Parhar).  The remaining 40% of the drugs are trafficked 
via the mountainous Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Region (through 
Ishkashim, Khorog, Roushan and Kalay Khumb).100   
Tajikistan was in recent years particularly affected by trafficking of heroin, 
following the establishment of a number of repositories and clandestine heroin 
laboratories in northern Afghanistan close to the Tajik border.  A reverse traffic of 
precursor chemicals apparently runs from other Central Asian countries and/or the 
Russian Federation for the manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan.  
With regard to Central Asia the ‘typical trafficking profits’ are derived from 
purchasing opium and heroin in Tajikistan, in the border areas with northern Afghanistan, 
and selling the opium within Central Asia and the heroin in the Russian Federation. 
While the profits made from opium trafficking are minimal, gross profits made by 
shipping heroin to Moscow and selling it there are huge.  Intelligence information, as 
well as, arrest statistics indeed show a very strong involvement of criminal groups of 
Central Asian origin in this trade: “92% of drug smugglers arrested at Russia’s borders in 
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1999 had a Central Asian background; 75% were Tajiks, 9% Uzbeks, 4% Kazakhs, 3% 
from Kyrgyzstan and 1% were from Turkmenistan.”101  
While heroin and morphine seizures showed an upward trend over the last two 
decades, heroin seizures only started to increase strongly as of the late 1990s, reflecting 
increasing levels of heroin manufacture within Afghanistan.  In 2001, morphine seizures 
declined in the region, mainly due to falling morphine seizures in Iran.  Improved heroin 
manufacture capacity meant that morphine was increasingly transformed into heroin 
within Afghanistan.  Thus heroin seizures continued to increase in 2001.  There was, 
however, a shift in the trafficking routes.  Heroin trafficking via Central Asia increased 
while trafficking via Iran lost in importance.  Heroin purity declined in the region in 
2001, but rose again in the following year.  This was a reflection of Afghanistan’s large 
opium harvest in 2002.  The strongest growth rates - by far - in heroin seizures in recent 
years were reported from the Central Asian countries, notably from Tajikistan.  
“Tajikistan was the only country in the region which showed rising levels of heroin 
seizures in 2001, reflecting shifts in trafficking routes towards northern Afghanistan, and 
thus further on to Tajikistan, and improved enforcement efforts by the authorities of 
Tajikistan.”102  
A closer look at the trafficking routes that plague Tajikistan will now be 
described.  To begin with, it was widely believed that the road from Kharog in Tajikistan 
to Osh in Kyrgyzstan was the most commonly used road for smuggling Afghan opium 
through Central Asia and on to Russia.  Of the six known trafficking routes operating in 
2001, two run through Pakistan and Iran, four through Central Asia.103  Three of the four 
in Central Asia are considered to be in Tajikistan, the other in Turkmenistan.  One such 
road, the Kharog-Osh road, became one of the first focuses of regional and international 
anti-drug efforts.  When one drug route would become difficult for transport it led to the 
opening of another.   
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The areas around Panj and Moskovski are now considered the main avenues 
through which drugs enter Tajikistan from Afghanistan, while the significance of the 
Kharog-Osh road has considerably diminished.  Since Tajikistan remains the key area for 
Central Asia’s anti-drug efforts, focus has been centered on the main entry points of the 
towns of Panj and Moskovkii.  From these towns, the route proceeds to Dushanbe or 
Khujamd.  Next, from Dushanbe, drugs are usually shipped out to Moscow or Eastern 
Europe and from Khujand to Siberian cities such as Novosibirsk, Omsk and other 
Russian eastern areas.  The route through Moskovskii goes to Osh, then Kazakhstan and 
on to Russia.104  
Local officials refuse to discuss the transport of heroin between Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan and onward throughout Russia and Europe (with emphasis placed on the old 
“Silk Route”), but observers can see drugs travel frequently along another route between 
Badakhshan and Tajikistan’s (similarly named) Gomo-Badakhshan oblast.   
Sometimes these shipments travel close to trucks delivering humanitarian 
aid to Afghanistan.  Traffickers choose landlocked crossings like the route 
between Ishkashim, Afghanistan and Horoga, Tajikistan, which includes 
three guards along 160 kilometers.  As Tajiks and their Russian trainers 
watch the Pyandzh, this sort of flow is likely to gain speed and volume.105 
In addition to the many routes already mentioned, the geography of the region 
plays a very important role in drug trafficking.  For instance, the Kyrgyz border with 
Tajikistan is difficult to patrol since “large parts of it are more than 13,000 feet above sea 
level and temperatures fall to –40 degrees Fahrenheit in winter.”106 Only a few roads cut 
across the region, and until recently, they were all in bad repair.  There is a way around 
this and drug traffickers know these routes.   
Anyone with a horse, any other pack animal, a helicopter, or a plane is 
effectively able to evade detection.  This has made drug trafficking a 
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pursuit of the well-connected (to military and security) as well as of the 
poor, while crippling those who take seriously enforcing the law.107 
Drugs continue being trafficked from Tajikistan via the border near Khojand into 
the Syrdarya Oblast or via the southern route into the Sukhandarya Oblast in Uzbekistan.  
Significant trafficking was also reported on the Dushanbe-Moscow train.  Another major 
route goes from Gorno-Badakshan region of Tajikistan, through Osh in Kyrgyzstan, and 
into Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley.  (Indeed, most seizures in Kyrgyzstan continue to 
take place in Batken and Osh provinces).   
Prior to 1998 and the closing of the border between Afghanistan and 
Uzbekistan opiates were also directly trafficked from Afghanistan to 
Uzbekistan.  As this border (“Friendship Bridge” on the Amudarya river) 
was opened again after the fall of the Taliban regime, one might expect 
trafficking along this route as well.108  
Uzbekistan is also considered a main transit country for Afghanistan’s opiates, but 
they enter primarily via Tajikistan rather than across the direct border.  Uzbekistan is 
better protected along its 450-kilometer border with Afghanistan than is Tajikistan 
because the Amu-Darya River is a natural obstacle.  There is a considerable less amount 
of drugs smuggled through this area of Central Asia.  Given Tajikistan’s enhanced heroin 
hauls, Uzbekistan’s apparent decline as a drugs route may be an indication that smugglers 
are more frequently flying their merchandise directly out of the region from Tajikistan. 
Railways linking Kazakhstan with Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the 
Russian Federation are considered to be the most important trafficking channels via 
Kazakhstan.  Important entry points into Kazakhstan are the rail crossing points of Rays 
(on the border with Uzbekistan) and Biney (on the border with Turkmenistan).109   
Drug traffic via motor vehicles enters Kazakhstan mostly by crossing the 
border in Chimkent, Jambil or Almaty provinces.  Most of the drugs going 
to Russia by rail or by vehicles cross the Russian border in the direction of 
Astrakhan, Orenburg, Chelyabinsk, Omsk and Novosibirsk.110   
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The drug traffickers in the region are able to shift their routes very easily when 
law enforcement tries to stop their dealings.  The countries of the region do not have the 
means to cope with drug trafficking.  Customs and border posts have no modern 
equipment or even weapons.  At the Tajik-Kyrgyz border there is very little or no 
control.111  The Murgab part of the Tajik-Afghan border is largely open.  The Khorog-
Osh road is “about 750 kilometers long and connects Tajikistan (Gorno Badakhshan) 
with the southern part of Kyrgyzstan (Sari-Tash and Osh), allowing easy access to 
Andijan (Uzbekistan).”112 The route is also an important connection with China.  There 
have been efforts to control the Sari-Tash post, but this attempt has led to drug smugglers 
changing routes and going from the Badakhshan region (in Kygyzstan) towards Dara-Ut-
Kurgan of the Chon Alai region and further down to Kyzyl-Kiya, Uzgen, and Jalal-Abad 
(in Kyrgyzstan) and then to Uzbekistan.113 
Another region that drug traffickers are particularly fond of is the “green border” 
between Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.  This area was named the green 
border because of its transparency.  Turkmenistan shares a border of 744 kilometers with 
Afghanistan.114  Drug trafficking routes through the area easier to monitor due to the 
geography of the region.  The shorter border region with Afghanistan helps officials 
monitor the drug trade in the region.  Drug traffickers still find ways to get their supplies 
by border officials, but they tend to find the path of least resistance.  “Some 80 tons of 
heroin are estimated to enter Turkmenistan each year with about 30 percent staying in the 
country.”115 These amounts are far fewer than the numbers Tajikistan sees in a year.  
Therefore, drug traffickers continue to utilize Tajikistan to their advantage. 
The Eastern European region plays a central role as a transit area for heroin 
trafficking.  Heroin is smuggled into the whole of Europe from Afghanistan, Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey through Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav republics, Romania and 
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Hungary — the so-called ‘Balkan route’ — and from the Central Asian states through 
Russia, the Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states along the so-called ‘silk route.’  Law-
enforcement agencies estimate “that at least 80 % of the heroin available in Europe is 
transported along the Baltic and Balkan routes.”116  
According to the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
(UNODC),  
80 % of heroin consumed in Western Europe comes from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  Half of this drug (about 120 tons of heroin equivalent) comes to 
Europe via Central Asia and Eastern and Central Europe.117   
During 2000, Germany’s role in the ‘silk route’ was probably reinforced, since it 
is not only a consumer country but also a significant gateway en route to the consumer 
markets of the European Union. 
When one route disappears, another route quickly appears, thus continuing the 
trafficking of drugs with an uninterrupted flow.  So many drugs are transported 
throughout the region that attempts to stop the flow of drugs throughout the region goes 
unnoticed.   
F. ETHNIC GROUPS AND ROUTES 
Ethnic links have not only played an important role in the expansion of poppy 
cultivation, they have also been crucial in setting up networks for cross-border 
trafficking, thus providing the infrastructure for the opiate industry to flourish.  Such 
networks have to rely on trust, and being of the same ethnic group provides this.   
Thus, irrespective of a general trend towards globalization, most cross-
border smuggling operations – worldwide - continue to be organized along 
ethnic lines.  Afghanistan is no exception in this regard.118  
A variety of ethnic groups are involved in opium production though there seems 
to be a concentration among Pashtun and Tajik villages located in the main opium 
producing regions of southern, eastern and northern Afghanistan.  Opium cultivation 
spread throughout the country in the 1990s, following the ethnic distribution of traveling 
                                                 
116 Andrushchak, Lidia, et al.  “Drug Abuse and HIV/AIDS – Lessons Learned.” UNDCP Annual 
Report, April 2002, p. 16. 
117 Ibid, p. 17. 
118 Chawla, et al., p. 52. 
44 
workers who disseminated the instruction for opium production.  “Trafficking then 
spread to neighboring countries, facilitated by ethnic links across borders: Pashtuns in 
Pakistan; Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran; Tajiks in Tajikistan; Uzbeks in Uzbekistan; and 
Turkmens in Turkmenistan.”119   
If one includes ethnically mixed villages with a Tajik population, Tajik opium 
production could be “also identified in Uruzgan (southern Afghanistan) and including 
such village’s data suggest that most ‘Tajik opium’ production might actually have taken 
place in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, followed by Nangarhar province 
(eastern Afghanistan).”120 Badakshan (northern Afghanistan) ranked only third.  “A 
tentative estimate suggests that the proportion of Tajik villages in all opium producing 
villages increased from 9% in 1994 to 12% in 2000.”121 This is based on 2001 cultivation 
data and the assumption that, as in 1994,  
2% of all villages in the Pashtun provinces were Tajik, 70% of all villages 
in Badakshan were Tajik, and that in provinces not covered by the 1994 
survey, about 40% of opium producing villages in other parts of northern 
Afghanistan were Tajik.  The figure thus calculated was 400 villages or 
44% of all poppy-producing villages in 2001.122  
Though Badakhshan is the traditional center of Tajiks living in Afghanistan, and 
82% of all Tajik poppy-producing villages were located in Badakhshan, only 28% of all 
opium produced by Tajik villages actually came from Badakhshan. The bulk (68%) was 
produced by Tajik villages located in Nangarhar (eastern Afghanistan).123 In addition, the 
survey also found Tajik villages producing opium in Kunar and in Helmand province.  
As one can see, ethnic ties in neighboring countries allow drug trafficking to be 
easier.  Afghanistan has many ethnic ties with Tajikistan; therefore, drug trafficking 
through the region is to be expected.  Since the end of the Tajik Civil War in 1997, many 
ethnic ties have kept the lines of communication open throughout the area.  These close 
ties allow drugs to filter across the border without much resistance.  Also, as discussed 
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previously, ethnic ties with other states within the CIS allow drug to transport throughout 
that region with modest success. 
G. DRUG PRECURSORS AND LABORATORIES 
The following will show how laboratories and routes are directly tied to one 
another.  The northern portion of Afghanistan is gaining strength and the amount of 
laboratories in the region proves that the drug trafficking routes are swinging north.  
Ethnic ties and the discrete laboratories in the region are creating a shift in drug 
trafficking.    
It is believed that most precursors for the production of heroin in Afghanistan 
come from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan inherited 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries from the Soviet era.  Acetic anhydride, the most 
commonly used chemical in the production of heroin, is produced legally in Uzbekistan.  
Kazakhstan also produces the chemical, and there are concerns over controls of its stocks.   
On average, 22 tons of acetic anhydride is enough to make seven to ten 
tons of heroin.  In 1998 over 16 tons of acetic anhydride was seized in 
Uzbekistan, while being illegally transported.124   
It was discovered that not all of the seized chemical was locally produced.  In 
fact, some came from Russia and China, but all the shipments were bound for 
Afghanistan. 
Originally, Afghanistan was only a producer of opium.  As of the mid-1990s, 
however, heroin manufacture began to take place within Afghanistan.  Most of the early 
morphine/heroin laboratories were located in eastern Afghanistan, having shifted across 
the border from neighboring Pakistan.  “In subsequent years, heroin laboratories could be 
found in the border regions of most opium poppy growing areas, i.e. in eastern, southern 
and northern Afghanistan.”125  In particular in northern Afghanistan the bulk of opiates 
are now already smuggled out of the country in the form of heroin.  Profitability 
considerations played a role.  However, data also suggest that it was not so much 
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profitability as such, but the possibility of taking more profits per unit trafficked which 
led to the shift.  
Heroin manufacture is very likely to have remained a lucrative business activity in 
Afghanistan for those clandestine laboratories which (i) had acquired sufficient opium 
stocks when the opium price was still low, or (ii) were not limited to selling their heroin 
to traders within Afghanistan but had a direct access to foreign heroin markets, or (iii) 
were able to adapt to falling profit margins by increasing their efficiency levels.126   
UNDCP is aware of a number of small-to medium scale laboratories operating in 
eastern and southern Afghanistan and, in recent years, increasingly in northern 
Afghanistan.  Such laboratories, “which earlier had been set up in Pakistan and were later 
moved across the border to eastern Afghanistan, produce, on average, some 10 kg of 
brown heroin per day; they often produce only during a limited period (some 4 months), 
following the opium harvest.127  In northern Afghanistan many of the newly set up 
laboratories are also small in size, often family run, producing between 5 and 10 kg of 
heroin a day.  In addition, classified information suggests that there are also a number of 
large morphine/heroin laboratories in southern, eastern and northern Afghanistan which 
have been producing up to 150 kg of morphine base a day.128  They produce morphine/ 
heroin, in general, without interruption.  
The above examples show how laboratories and routes are directly tied to one 
another.  The northern portion of Afghanistan is gaining strength and the amount of 
laboratories in the region proves that the drug trafficking routes are swinging north.  
Ethnic ties and the discrete laboratories in the region are creating a shift in drug 
trafficking.    
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Since the break up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s, drug trafficking has 
increased dramatically in the Central Asian region.  Afghanistan has increased production 
of opium/heroin in the region and has found trafficking routes that are able to get the 
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drugs out of their country into Central Asia, Russia, and Europe.  Drug trafficking 
organizations keep the supply lines open and increasingly develop new ones as old ones 
get blocked.   
Supply lines and trafficking routes that were once heavily used have been shifting 
to areas where drug traffickers are less likely to get caught and where border security is 
still a problem.  For example, the share of “heroin seizures in Iran – disregarding 
Pakistan’s likely over-representation in these data - rose from around 15% over the 1994-
96 period to almost half in 1999 before falling back to about a quarter in 2000/2001.”129  
The strongest growth in trafficking took place in Central Asia.  “The share of the Central 
Asian countries’ seizures rose from less than 1% over the 1994-96 period to close to 30% 
of regional heroin seizures by the year 2001, reflecting the increased use of the northern 
route via Tajikistan as well as improvements in controlling borders with Afghanistan.”130 
The increase in trafficking and data on seizures show how Tajikistan is seeing a dramatic 
rise in drug trafficking across their border region with Afghanistan. 
The example above shows how Central Asia, especially Tajikistan, is becoming a 
focal point for drug traffickers.  Chapter II showed how there is a drug problem in 
Central Asia.  Evidence showed there are problems, the reasons for the problems, and 
why it is a matter of concern to Russia and the United States.  This chapter showed why 
the Afghanistan-Tajikistan cross-border trafficking is center of gravity.  Additionally, it 
analyzed the trafficking groups and routes in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.  Chapter IV will 
examine the strategies and capacities of the border agencies and how they fall short.  
Chapter V will offer policy recommendations and conclusions.   
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IV. BORDER AGENCIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Geographical contiguity, racial and religious affinity and long established border 
trade have provided a strong basis for cross-border fraternization between the people of 
Central Asia and adjoining Afghanistan, particularly its northern part also known as 
Afghan Turkestan.  Afghanistan not only shares its borders with the three Central Asian 
states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but the majority of people settled in 
northern Afghanistan are also of the Central Asian stock. 
Tajikistan, a state that is completely landlocked, consists of very rough terrain that 
is comprised of mountains, cliffs and glaciers.  There are very few transportation links 
through the area that gives Tajikistan limited access to neighboring countries.  Security 
problems resulting from the increasing flow of narcotics illegally smuggled across the 
1200 km Tajikistan-Afghanistan border have become critical in understanding the nature 
of political instability within Central Asia.  Unfortunately, drug smuggling trade across 
the Tajikistan border has been flourishing without much intervention.   
Chapter II established why the Afghanistan-Tajikistan cross-border trafficking is 
the center of gravity and then analyzed trafficking groups and routes in Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan.  Chapter III showed the growing shift in the drug trade from the eastern, 
western and southern routes to the northern route.  Additionally the chapter explained 
why Central Asia, in particular Tajikistan, has seen an increase in drug trafficking 
through the region, why other countries are not the focal route, the effects of drug abuse 
and neglect, and why the United States and Russia need to focus more attention on the 
Central Asian drug trafficking dilemma.  Chapter IV examines the strategies and 
capacities of the border agencies and how they fall short. 
B. HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY 
Knowing and understanding the history and geography of Russia is necessary to 
better comprehend why border security is such a problem area for Tajikistan.  It will be 
necessary to ask why the collapse of the Soviet Union led to security weaknesses within 
the border system and why it is necessary for the newly independent states to develop a 
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sound border security program.  Can Tajikistan provide a stable system without the help 
of Russia?  Is Russia able to keep border guards in Tajikistan to help stop the flow drugs 
across the porous border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan?  These questions will be 
answered in detail, but it will be necessary to see how the fall of the Soviet Union led to 
the newly independent states of Central Asia struggling with border security (in particular 
Tajikistan) and why this region is prone to drug trafficking. 
The collapse of the Soviet border guard structures and the slow emergence of the 
Federal Border Service (FPS) of the Russian Federation is one of the least known 
episodes in the history of Russia’s power structures.  The collapse of the political and 
economic system which dominated the Soviet Union for more than seventy years was 
almost immediately followed by the collapse of the union and the gradual emergence of 
14 independent states, eight of whom have land borders with Russia (Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan); one (Turkmenistan) 
shares the Caspian Sea with Russia and several other countries; and five (Armenia, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Moldova) do not share borders with Russia 
although Armenia and Tajikistan regard Moscow as a political ally and allow Russia to 
station border troops on their soil.   
The new borders with the newly independent republics were yet to be delineated, 
demarcated and their infrastructure built and manned.  The old external, Soviet borders of 
the new republics were crumbling fast and the borders in the Baltic countries and the 
Transcaucasus had practically ceased to exist.  By June 1992, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Byelorussia, the Transcaucasus and Central Asian states had begun to organize their own 
border guard structures and the Russian border troops, with a rapidly dwindling conscript 
pool, still guarded the Kyrgyz, Tajik and Turkmen borders.   
Russia presently has16 neighbors and an extensive border system.  Their borders 
are approximately 61,000 km long.  Of the total 14,500 km of Russian land borders, 
13,500 km were new in 1992.  Some parts have not yet been delineated and some have 
not yet been demarcated.  Russia’s water frontiers (sea, rivers and lakes) stretch for about 
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56,500 km, of which about 38,000 km is the sea coastline.  Russia’s exclusive economic 
zone covers 8.6 million km.131 
In an interview with Federal Border Service Director Colonel-General Konstantin 
Vasilyevich Totskiy, he stated that,  
Russia’s border is something unique and not a single state in the world has 
such a vast territory, such a long border, and such a diverse pattern, if you 
take any parameters that usually characterize the borderline of any state.  
We have all of these.  It includes the variety of physical and geographical 
and climatic conditions, from the Arctic conditions to the Black Sea coast, 
it is 12 time zones, it is the huge exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf of the Russian Federation.132 
Statistically there is one Russian border detachment per 100, or more, kilometers 
when, according to the present director of the FPS, there should be one detachment for 
every 10-15 km.  “Of the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation 45 are border regions, and 
they include about 74 million people, i.e. 49.9% of the total population of the Russian 
Federation.”133  Twenty-four subjects of the Russian Federation are border regions for 
the first time.  Russia is feeling the effects of this vast border and is continually studying 
and examining its border guard system.   
C. TAJIKISTAN BORDER SECURITY (RUSSIAN BORDER GUARDS) 
Border security in Tajikistan is important in helping to stop the drug trade that 
plagues the country.  The most important security structure responsible for the security of 
the Tajik border is Russian, not a Tajik group.  Russia has maintained its border troops 
within Tajikistan after the break up of the USSR in 1991.  This is primarily due to the 
instability that was apparent in the country at that time.  On 23 September 1992, the FPS 
Border Group was officially set up in Tajikistan, and on 25 May 1993 a bilateral 
agreement between Russia and Tajikistan was signed that gives the authority for the 
protection of the Tajik border to the FPS.134 Originally this agreement was intended only 
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to serve as an interim measure until the city of Dushanbe could construct and sufficiently 
strengthen its own border guard to protect its borders.  The border group of the FPS 
stationed in Tajikistan is quite unique as a military formation, with “7% of its officers, 
nearly 50% of the warrant officers, 69% of contract servicemen and 99% of conscripts 
are Tajik citizens.”135 The rest of the personnel in the FPS are Russian.  
They are equipped with more than 300 artillery systems and artillery 
pieces. Although they have potential support from the Tajik Air force, in 
practical terms this often breaks down, since in the event of a violation of 
Tajik airspace the FPS can only inform the Tajik Air Force - operational 
control belongs to the Tajik MoD.136  
Additionally, eight tactic groups and artillery of the 201st Mechanized Infantry 
Division cover the border posts at the Pyandzh and Moscow border units.  The SU-25 
planes of the Detached Aviation Group and helicopters of the army aviation provide the 
air support.137 
The Russian Journal Daily in Moscow said “the international community must do 
more to cut the cultivation of drugs in Afghanistan to halt a growing tide of narcotics that 
flows into Russia and beyond.” Lt. Gen. Konstantin Totskiy said that,  
The 10,700-strong Russian border guard unit on the border between 
Afghanistan and the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan had seized 5 1/2 
metric tons (6.05 tons) of drugs, about 42 percent of it heroin, last year.  In 
the first six months of 2002, they have seized 1,741 kilograms - almost 60 
percent of it heroin, he said.138   
Traditionally, more drugs are confiscated during the second half of the year, after 
the poppy harvest.  The amount of narcotics seized in any country accounts for just “one-
tenth of the true flow,”139 Totskiy said in an interview with The Associated Press.  About 
20-25 percent of the heroin that arrives in Russia is headed for Europe, Russian officials 
warn.  “If Europe, the international community, wants to strengthen its borders ... it’s our 
conviction that the pressure has to be applied before the bow leaves the arrow,” Totskiy 
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said. “Once the arrow has flown, it’s very hard to catch.”140 
 The Russian border guards, the majority of them conscripts and contract soldiers 
from Tajikistan, are stationed on the Afghan border to try to catch drugs and weapons 
before they reach Russia.  More than 10,000 Russian soldiers are also stationed in the 
Central Asian nation to help the impoverished Tajik government to protect its nation’s 
borders.141 
 Russia and Tajikistan have been at the forefront of efforts to construct a so-called 
security belt around Afghanistan.  The plan is to strengthen border controls to stem the 
flow of drugs being smuggled out of the nation on foot or by donkey.   
They are consolidating it into convoys and they move in armed groups.  
Three or four in the front with Kalashnikovs.  Maybe five in the middle 
carrying up to 400 pounds on their backs.  Then maybe five more in the 
back, heavily armed.142   
Apparently, “they are well-equipped,” according to Gordiyenko, the officer of the 
Russian guard that patrols the Tajik-Afghan border under an agreement with the Tajik 
government.  
They have night-vision equipment.  They have modern weapons.  They 
have good intelligence.143  
Additionally, Col. Saidato Merzoev of the Tajik border guard service in Shurobod 
region said,  
Traffickers use satellite phones to coordinate drops, and often have night 
vision equipment and wear Russian uniforms to fool guards.  Informants 
advise them when troops are eating so they can time their illegal forays 
across the border.144  
On the other side of the border, “Afghan border guard commander Sameulloh 
Qatra said his troops are outmatched technologically by the narcotics traffickers: ‘We do 
not have such equipment as they [the drug traffickers] have to completely prevent the 
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smuggling of narcotics.  We do not have the capability to contain these smugglers.’”145 
By the time they get out of Afghanistan, the drugs enter a huge transport network of 
trucks, trains, airplanes and ships that are virtually impossible to monitor completely. 
 While Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government has banned poppy growing 
and is trying to find farmers alternative crops, drug experts around the world fear 
widespread resistance.  Afghanistan became the world’s leading opium producer during 
the 1990s, including the years ruled by the same warlords who are again in power. 
Totskiy said the warlords could make an easy dlrs 8,000 a hectare with each poppy 
harvest. “If we don’t overcome the resistance of these field commanders, then Russia is 
always going to have heroin, and Europe will, and America will,” he said. 
 As mentioned previously, the guards on the rugged Tajik-Afghan border are ill 
equipped to fight drug traffickers.  The guards have too few dogs and intelligence 
officers, and lack basic equipment such as radios, night-vision goggles, cars and gasoline.  
This year (2003), for the first time, they will be getting five thermal imagers, used to 
detect heat sources.  Unfortunately, they would need hundreds to monitor the 
mountainous border that passes through the marshy Pyandzh River.  Totskiy also urged 
that more be done on the ground in Afghanistan, including foreign donations of seed 
grain to Afghan farmers instead of ready-made flour.  
D. FPS COMMAND STRUCTURE 
After the breakup of the USSR Boris Yeltsin nominated General Andrey 
Nikolayev, the first deputy chief of the military General Staff, as the new head of the 
Border Guards.  After five months, all the reform plans were ready.  The Federal Border 
Service and the Main Command of the Border Troops was established on 30 December 
1993 by Presidential Decree No 2318.146  As a federal division of executive power, the 
FPS was tasked with protection of state borders, territorial waters, the continental shelf, 
and economic special zones and with the implementation of the state border policies.  
Yeltsin enacted further changes on 30 December 1994.  The name of the new 
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organization was shortened to the Federal Border Service, several departments were 
added to the central apparatus and some of the existing ones were reinforced. 
The FPS then had a central apparatus that includes: the Main Staff; the newly 
created demilitarized Border Guards Department; the FPS Aviation; the Main Military 
Council; the Military-Scientific Council; the Main Military-Technical Council; the 
Foreign Treaties Department; the Intelligence Department; the Operational-Investigative 
Department; the Counterintelligence Department; the Internal Security Department; the 
Center of Operational-Border Research; the Scientific Research Technical Test Center; 
and educational establishments.  The FPS had six Border Districts and several groups 
with different titles stationed in Russia and in some of the CIS states.  For the first time 
the head of the border guards became a member of the Security Council. 
In spite of the new, independent status of the FPS and his own military 
background, General Nikolayev tried to make the service more cost-effective and less 
military.  The FPS was there to protect Russia’s borders, not to defend them.  In 1996 he 
proposed to reduce the FPS and to improve co-operation with other interested federal 
organs, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Federal 
Security Service, the State Customs Committee, the Federal Migration Service, and the 
Intelligence Service.   
Change was inevitable for the border service and the most recent change 
happened this year (2003).  On March 11, 2003 President Putin expanded the turf of 
Russia’s domestic security agency, giving it responsibilities in government 
communications and border control that were once handled by the Soviet KGB.  The 
changes are part of a pattern of growing influence of the Federal Security Service, the 
KGB’s domestic successor, in the three years since Putin became president.  Putin decree 
“restored FSB control over the country’s 174,000 border guards, reversing Yeltsin’s 
creation of the Russian Border Service as an independent agency.”147  The hope is 
border, information and security services will be able to fulfill a common task more 
efficiently. 
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E. TAJIKISTAN BORDER GUARD SERVICE   
In Tajikistan “the responsibility for border security is placed under two “power-
ministries’:  the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Security.”148 Though Tajikistan is 
clearly heavily reliant upon Russia for its border security it does, however, possess its 
own border guard force, though substantially smaller and less able to fulfill its functions 
as effectively.149  The Tajik border guard service is structured in much the same way as 
the FPS, with its headquarters in Dushanbe and divided into regional districts responsible 
for the security of the state border.  The KOGG (Committee for the Protection of the 
State Border) is the Tajik border guard service.   
“The KOGG is much smaller than the FPS Border Group stationed in Tajikistan 
and struggles to cope with its responsibilities.”150 Due to its size and the lack of 
resources, the success of the Tajik border guard service in adequately protecting the Tajik 
border has been bleak.  The KOGG urgently requires improved communications and 
other equipment to detect cases of both drug and weapon trafficking across the border.  
The United States has told Lieutenant General Abdurahmon Azimov, Chairman of the 
KOGG, that they will assist in “supplying communication, transport as well as training 
skilled specialists.”151  The KOGG needs to work on attracting quality personnel and 
then should work on expanding its involvement in the illegal drug trafficking. 
Dushanbe plans to expand the KOGG in the coming years in order to take over 
more functions currently carried out by the FPS Border Group in Tajikistan.  Azimov is 
hoping that the KOGG will triple in strength over the next two years, based on manpower 
cuts in other law enforcement agencies, though it remains unclear as to which 
departments and units will be reduced. 
The Tajik Drug Control Agency (AKN) was created in 1998 by the support of 
President Rakhmonov and with the financial assistance of the UN.  “Its main function is 
to document and collect data and curb regional drug trafficking.”152 This security agency 
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is under the direct supervision of President Rakhmonov with a staff of more than 300.  
This staff will be hired over a three-year period and the UNDCP has offered to assist in 
the hiring process, as well as supplying communications and other equipment.  President 
Rakhmonov realizes that there is a great deal of corruption in the KOGG and believes 
that he can help in the success of the AKN.  Additionally, in order to avoid corruption 
within the AKN, the “salaries to employees of the AKN are very high:  ranging between 
$100 to $600 per month (the average monthly salary in Tajikistan is less than $10 per 
month).”153 Employment in the AKN involves a strict selection process and over 90% of 
its employees have higher education.  Higher education in Tajikistan is a rarity.  “Since 
its creation in 1999 it has accumulated a database of drug smugglers containing 19,000 
individuals, it also works very closely with Russian agencies such as the MVD, FSB, and 
FPS and internally with the KOGG.”154 Focus has now been turned to Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan is working on programs to curb drug trafficking.  Dushanbe and Kabul are 
sharing intelligence and helping to train Afghan specialists in counter drug strategies. 
The role of President Vladimir Putin is critical in shaping the priorities and 
directing the nature of border security policy.  Putin approved a border security concept 
on “1 September 2001, entitled: ‘The Concept for Guarding the Russian Federation State 
border, the Internal Maritime Waters, the Territorial Sea, the continental Shelf, the 
Russian Federation Exclusive Economic Zone, and Their Natural Resources in 2001-
2005’.”155  The concept describes the security concerns of the Russian Federation, which 
look at the increase of the smuggling of narcotics, weapons and ammunition, and the 
activity of transnational organized crime.  Also, it looks at the activities of terrorist 
organizations and groups and illegal armed formations across the state border.   
F. 201ST MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION 
Russian influence in Central Asia is a significant factor in the present strategic 
situation around Afghanistan. The most important military element in that influence is the 
motor rifle division in Tajikistan.  Taking a look back in history between the years of 
1945 to 1991 it can be seen that the 201 Motor Rifle Division (MRD) was stationed in the 
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Central Asian Military District and was one of the first formations to enter Afghanistan 
after the Soviet invasion in December 1979.  
The division served in Afghanistan throughout the war and was awarded a 
second Order of the Red Banner in 1985.  One of its armored personnel 
carriers, BTR-60 No 305, was the last vehicle to cross back onto Soviet 
territory, carrying General Boris Gromov and the banner of 40th Army.  
The vehicle is preserved as a memorial within the division.156  
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 most of the former Soviet forces in 
Central Asia came under the control of the new republics in which they were deployed. 
“The disintegration of the Tajik government and the outbreak of civil war in 1992 
ensured a different fate for the 201st.”157  Its locally-conscripted Tajik soldiers slipped 
away as the war began but the mostly Russian officers and warrant officers stayed at their 
posts, bringing their families into their barracks and refusing to surrender their arms and 
equipment to the mobs outside. 
The 201st has faced its share of difficulties during its onset and fell short of 
meeting Yeltsin’s goals.  One key event that brought the weakness of the 201st to light 
was Nabiyev’s ouster on September 2, 1992 by the Islamic extremist parties.158  The 
escalation of fighting in Tajikistan provoked prompt and strong reaction from Russia and 
the neighboring Central Asian states.  Just one day after the removal of Nabiyev, the 
Presidents of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan issued a warning to the 
government and political organizations of Tajikistan describing the unrest as a danger to 
the CIS.  They also announced their collective decision to deploy CIS troops along the 
1300 km long Tajik-Afghan border to stop the large scale smuggling of arms and cross 
border movement of armed bands.  Towards the end of September 1992 the Russian 
Defense Minister sent additional troops to strengthen the beleaguered 201st Motorized 
Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan and authorized its commanding officers to prevent 
seizure of arms, equipment and munitions belonging to Russian troops and unlawful acts 
against Russian Servicemen and their families.  But matters were made worse by the 
                                                 
156 Orr, M. J. “The Russian Garrison in Tajikistan – 201st Gatchina Twice Red Banner Motor Rifle 
Division.” Conflict Studies Research Center, Occasional Brief No. 85, 18 October 2001, p. 1. 
157 Ibid, p. 2. 
158 Rakhmon Nabiyev, the former Communist who had been elected as the President of Tajikistan in 
Novembcr 1991, tried to buy peace by including members of the Islamist opposition groups in government 
and administration.  But the IRP and its supporters were determined to wrest total political control. 
59 
connivance of Tajik authorities and leaders with the armed Tajik extremist groups and 
Afghan field commanders.  Piqued at this ground situation the Russian Border Guards 
Officers Corps in Tajikistan sent an appeal to Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia on 
November 13, 1992 questioning the expediency of further stay of their units in the 
absence of guarantees of legal and social protection.  The stiff opposition by Tajik media 
and Islamic parties compounded the problem to the presence of Russian troops who were 
accused of interference in the internal affairs of Tajikistan and were even charged of 
supplying/selling arms and fuel to anti-Islamic forces. 
In September 1992 “President Yeltsin took 201 MRD under Russian jurisdiction 
and it became the basis of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan.”159  
When the Tajik civil war ended and the peacekeeping force was disbanded the Russian 
and Tajik governments agreed that the division should be transformed into a military 
base. However the agreement, “signed on 16 April 1999, has never been formally 
implemented and 201 MRD’s present and future status within Tajikistan remain 
undefined.”160 
The 201 MRD retains the classic Soviet motor rifle divisional organization, with 
three motor rifle regiments and combat support and combat service support units.  
“Divisional headquarters is located in the Giprozemgorodok barracks complex on the 
outskirts of Dushanbe, together with 92 Motor Rifle Regiment and most of the support 
units (tank battalion, artillery regiment, air defense regiment, engineer, signals, 
reconnaissance, transport and maintenance elements, etc).”161 The 149 Guards Motor 
Rifle Regiment is based in Kulyab and 191 Motor Rifle Regiment in Kurgan-Tyube.162  
Additionally, a helicopter squadron with Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters supports the 
division from Dushanbe South airport.  Fixed wing aircraft are also deployed on rotation 
from squadrons in the Russian Federation.  “The division has 160 tanks, 300 armored 
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personnel carriers, about 200 artillery pieces and mortars and 1100 transport vehicles. Its 
total strength is between 6,000 and 7,000 men and women.”163 
The main role of 201 MRD is to provide “echeloned support” for the Russian 
Border Guard forces on the Tajik-Afghan border.  This mission dates back to the events 
of “July 1993 when a border post was over-run by Tajik rebels and The Russian Garrison 
in Tajikistan - 201st Gatchina Twice Red Banner Motor Rifle Division its garrison 
gruesomely massacred.”164 The disaster revealed the low tactical standards of the Border 
Troops and an almost total lack of co-ordination between the Border Guards and 201 
MRD. 
The division now provides, “7 reinforced company tactical groups in static 
positions to back up the border guards…149 Guards Motor Rifle Regiment supports the 
Moskovskiy district's 117 Border Detachment and 191 Motor Rifle Regiment supports 48 
Border Detachment in the Pyandzh district.”165 Dushanbe based units are also used to 
reinforce the border, especially artillery and engineer elements.  The company tactical 
groups basically consist of a motor rifle company with tank and mortar sub-units. 
“Coordination with the border guards has improved since 1993; joint procedures 
have been established and motor rifle and border guard troops do train together.”166  
However there have been no major border incursions (as opposed to smuggling or illegal 
immigration) since 1995.  Deployments along the border last for a month and the 
company group is then rotated back to its base. 
The Dushanbe garrison provides guards for vulnerable points such as the Russian 
embassy, the Russian school, its own barracks and armaments and fuel depots.  Air 
defense units are responsible for both air and ground defense of the Russian air group at 
Dushanbe South airfield.  “92 Motor Rifle Regiment in Dushanbe has provided a 
company or platoon for the ‘Centrasbat’ series of multinational peace-keeping exercises 
which have been held annually since 1997.”167 It also seems that this regiment will also 
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provide a reinforced motor rifle battalion as the Russian contribution to the new Central 
Asian Rapid Deployment Force.  This force was set up under CIS auspices in 2001 and 
so far has held a couple of command post exercises and a low-level field firing exercise 
in October in Kyrgyzstan.   
It is not clear whether the force is yet considered fully operational.  It was 
originally intended to counter incursions into the Osh valley and a change 
of focus might delay its availability.168 
The anti-terrorist and anti-drug operations in Afghanistan have obviously had an 
impact on 201 MRD.  Although there are conflicting reports about the raising of its 
readiness state, Russian television has shown pictures of a pontoon bridge being built 
across the Pyandzh River so that military equipment can be passed to the Northern 
Alliance.  It is probable that the Afghan end of the bridge is protected by Russian troops 
and some sources claim that advisers are training Northern Alliance troops to use their 
new weapons and helping to maintain them.  Such advisers are most likely to come from 
201 MRD, but official Russian sources have so far denied their presence in Afghanistan.  
At the end of September a meeting between Emomali Rakhmonov, the president of 
Tajikistan and Vladimir Rushaylo, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, 
emphasized that preventing Afghan refugees from entering Tajikistan is a major mission 
for the division and the border guards.169 
Unfortunately, there are serious limitations on the division’s effectiveness.  It has 
not received much new equipment (if any) since the Afghan War and the supply of spares 
and ammunition is often disrupted by local bureaucratic quarrels.  In terms of manpower 
it is only half a division and at least a third of its rank and file have only been in the 
country for a few weeks.  In normal times acclimatization and shakedown training are 
reckoned to take up to three months.  For the last decade the division has been playing a 
largely static, defensive role, guarding key points and convoys, manning fortified 
positions near the border and rehearsing local deployments to backup frontier posts under 
attack.  There has been no field training above battalion level.  All these factors indicate 
that the 201 MRD is unlikely to operate as a division-size formation.  It would be able to 
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assist the border guards in refugee management, although a major exodus into Tajikistan 
would probably overwhelm any force that could be deployed along the 1,400 kilometer 
border. 
G. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO TAJIKISTAN BORDER SYSTEM 
The U.S. Department of State Anti-Crime Training and Technical Assistance 
(ACTTA) Program provides support for counter-narcotics and anti-crime efforts in 
Tajikistan.  The support provided during FY 2002 was modest due to the security 
situation in the country and the limited U.S. presence.  Much of the U.S. assistance 
provided consisted of training for Tajik officials, including Customs and Drug Control 
Agency representatives.  The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) helped prepare senior and working-level Tajik law 
enforcement officials by sponsoring training courses, seminars and conferences, mainly 
at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest.  In addition, Tajik 
law enforcement officials participated in a train-the-trainer course in Dushanbe on 
narcotics detection and interdiction sponsored by the U.S. Customs Service, drug 
enforcement seminars in Tashkent sponsored by the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, and regional prosecutorial development and assistance conferences 
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice.  The U.S. Customs Service also sponsored 
the travel to the U.S. of four officers from the Tajik Customs Service and Drug Control 
Agency to participate in a weeklong border interdiction seminar.  Law enforcement 
training programs prepared Tajik participants for combating terrorism, narcotics 
trafficking, and weapons proliferation, and addressed law enforcement in a context of 
rule of law and human rights.   
In FY 2002, the major initiative to combat the flow of narcotics out of 
neighboring Afghanistan and into and across Tajikistan has been the establishment of the 
Tajik Drug Control Agency, with the help of the United Nations Drug Control Program 
(UNDCP).  Through INL, the U.S. Government has provided funding for this project and 
the agency has met with successes in centralizing and expanding Tajik drug control 
efforts.  Tajik authorities are currently reviewing a draft Letter of Agreement that will 
provide a basis for developing new projects with INL.  Drug seizures, mainly heroin 
originating in Afghanistan, remain the highest in the region.  In FY 2003, FY 2002 
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Supplemental funding will be used to provide additional infrastructure development to 
combat drug trafficking, including funding for the continued operations of the Drug 
Control Agency and funding for judicial programs, financial crime deterrence and drug 
interdiction.  
The U.S. Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security 
(EXBS) Program is another program utilized for assisting Tajikistan.  In FY 2002, the 
U.S. Government continued to provide EXBS assistance to Tajikistan focused on 
developing and enhancing the country's capabilities to prevent proliferation and detect, 
interdict, and investigate illegal transfers of weapons, drugs and materials.  In the wake of 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, “Tajikistan was allocated $7.5 million from the 
Emergency Response Fund supplemental appropriation for enhanced border security 
activities under the EXBS Program.”170  These funds are being used to procure 
“uniforms, communications equipment, vehicles, Global Positioning Systems, binoculars, 
generators, remodeling a training center for an English language laboratory, interdiction 
tool kits with border enforcement training, pagers, ground sensors, personal gear for 
officers, train-the-trainer equipment and portal monitors.”171 FY 2002 efforts were also 
targeted at support for infrastructure upgrades at border patrol training academies and to 
further enhance legal and regulatory mechanisms.  In November 2002,  
Tajik officials received International Border Interdiction Training in 
Hidalgo, Texas.  Russian Border Forces have recently withdrawn from the 
Chinese border, leaving the Tajikistan Border Guards new challenges to 
patrol and secure that border.172  
Russian border forces remain the primary force on the Tajikistan’s southern 
border with Afghanistan.  The Government of Tajikistan has participated in the EXBS-
funded Central Asian Regional Communications Link (CACL) that is strengthening intra-
governmental coordination on border security, and helping Tajikistan and its neighbors 
tighten control over illicit trafficking and movement of international terrorists.  
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Tajikistan’s border security officials also have taken part in regional and international 
export control and border security training workshops and conferences. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Tajikistan faces numerous difficulties when studying the border security dilemma 
in the region.  The state is unable to effectively combat drug trafficking across its border 
with Afghanistan.  Tajikistan is severely restricted by its topography, impoverished and 
stagnant economy, pervasive corruption in the political and security bodies and the poor 
condition of the KOGG.  President Rakhmonov is dependent upon the continued security 
assistance provided by the Russian Federation despite public declarations in Dushanbe 
concerning expanding and increasing the role of the KOGG.  If governments in Central 
Asia are serious about wanting stability, corruption is one of the most important issues 
for them to address.  Experience elsewhere has shown that tackling corruption requires a 
broad program of complementary measures, including legislation, higher salaries, less 
bureaucracy and consistent political leadership.  Genuine attempts to implement such 
policies in Central Asia would begin to undermine many of the region’s largest drug 
traffickers. 
The Central Asian Border Guards and their Russian commanders, who continued 
to remain under the CIS unified command, did not receive adequate support from Russia 
after the disintegration of USSR.  The Border Guards defending the Tajik-Afghan border 
were now facing acute shortage of men, fuel and funds that prevented them to get 
reinforcements or increase mobility for effectively dealing with the increased border 
violations.  Besides, the Russian officers and troops were reluctant to shed their blood for 
the security of Tajikistan that was now an independent and sovereign country. 
The FPS faces many issues with its Federal Border Guard Service (FPS).  The 
immigration issues, border disputes, education issues, aviation and naval shortages and 
many problems that face the FPS will hopefully be resolved.  President Putin and General 
Totskiy were essential elements to ensure the success of the FPS and the many programs 
involved, but on 11 March 2003, President Putin announced the most significant reforms 
of the Russian security structures since the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation 
declared, on 15 January 1992, that Boris Yeltsin’s decision to establish a Ministry of 
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Security and Internal Affairs was illegal.  The Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) was 
transferred to the Federal Security Service (FSB), not as an equal partner but as a 
substructure.173   
The FSB’s new border guard element will improve its position among the Russian 
power structures. General Patrushev has inherited the largest border guarding 
organization in the world.  “Even with the planned staff reductions from 200,000 to 
182,500 by 2006, the border guards will be the numerically largest component of the 
FSB.”174 They will also become an important FSB asset in collecting information useful 
to all power bodies.  The border guard work will force the FSB and the MVD to improve 
and streamline their cooperation.  In addition to its law enforcement functions, the MVD 
is in charge of immigration procedures and of issuing many legal documents. The 
contacts that it had in the past with the FPS will now be transferred to the FSB.175 
 The examples above show how border security in Tajikistan is weak and changes 
are needed to provide a more solid border system.  Due to the weak border and numerous 
other problems facing the region, it is no wonder why Tajikistan has become a focal point 
for drug traffickers.  Chapter two showed how there is a drug problem in Central Asia.  
Evidence showed there are problems, the reasons for the problems, and why it is a matter 
of concern to Russia and the United States.  Chapter three showed why the Afghanistan-
Tajikistan cross-border trafficking is center of gravity.  Additionally, it analyzed the 
trafficking groups and routes in Afghanistan and Tajikistan.  This chapter examined the 
strategies and capacities of the border agencies and how they fall short.  Chapter five will 
offer policy recommendations and conclusions.   
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Drug trafficking and drug use has seen an extremely fast growth throughout the 
Central Asian states.  There is no quick solution to the rapid rise in illegal activities 
between the states.  Many areas need to be closely looked at in order to try and slow the 
rising epidemic.  The terrain in many of the Central Asian states is not conducive to the 
proper border protection systems that would help curb drug trafficking.  Many problems 
and concerns have been listed, but action needs to take place in order to slow the rise in 
drug use and trade.  Continuing efforts are being attempted and governments are taking 
on new programs to try and stop the drug trafficking.  Money is a major issue and is one 
area that will slow the process immensely.  The continued involvement of UN support 
will aid the effort to fight drug trade and use. 
Western Europe has been the main destination for heroin from Afghanistan. 
Today, movements of people, goods and funds have intensified greatly in large and 
increasingly open geopolitical areas, like the European Union and the countries that will 
join it, but also in countries like the Commonwealth of Independent States, Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan.  Freedom is gaining ground, but this change also has unfortunate effects, 
including an increase in drug addiction in vulnerable populations and the emergence of 
powerful international criminal groups.   
International organized crime is growing rich from drug trafficking.  It generates 
terrible corruption.  The mafias controlling drug traffic are the same ones trafficking in 
persons and weapons, and all kinds of other criminal activities.  Central Asia, Russia and 
the United States must act together to ensure that these criminals do not find “gray areas” 
where they can prosper with impunity as borders are opened up.  Today’s criminal gangs 
use the most advanced technology.  They turn borders to their advantage, juggle with 
procedures and work with professionals.  Their many facets can threaten efforts to build 
up governments and democracy in new countries.  They are worming their way into the 
core of the world economic system, bringing crime, violence and anarchy.   
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The drug routes are also the paths of suffering, despair, weakness and disease. 
How many lives have been destroyed, how many families torn apart, how much potential 
spoiled when a youth or a child crosses the path of a dealer in death?  Drug addiction is a 
public health issue.  It threatens the fabric of society by excluding addicts and causes 
huge health damage (this includes the ravages of AIDS, hepatitis and tuberculosis). The 
fight against drugs must mobilize all health and social bodies at national and international 
levels.  There is a terrifying explosion in AIDS infection through intravenous drug use in 
some countries.  The countries hit hardest are the ones that do not have necessary means 
and structures to cope. 
Once again, the key words are action and solidarity.  Central Asia, Russia and the 
United States cannot shirk the duty to fight drug production and trafficking from one 
home front.  There are no longer transit countries or consumer countries; there are only 
victim countries.  Producing countries are locked in a vicious cycle.  Consumer countries 
are losing their lifeblood.   
B. PROBLEMS AND ANSWERS 
Chapter two discussed why drug trafficking has shifted to Tajikistan, the 
economics involved, the effects of drug production and trafficking and why the United 
States and Russia should concern themselves with the problems.  The economic situation 
is one of the main causes of frustration that makes Central Asia potentially highly 
explosive.  If stability is to come to the region, the factors contributing to economic 
decline must be addressed, including prominently the rising level of youthful drug 
addiction.   
Through the aid of the IMF and the World Bank, Tajikistan is slowly starting to 
recover from its economic difficulties.  Authorities have completed an inventory of 
government, government-guaranteed, and state-enterprise debts, and they have written to 
bilateral creditors to confirm the status of their debt.  Structural reform will be necessary 
to try and rebuild Tajikistan’s economic difficulties.   
The IMF has approved a three-year, US$87 million dollar poverty reduction and 
growth facility (PRGF) arrangement for Tajikistan.  This program has been put in place 
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to support the governments economic program through September 2005.176 The IMF 
plans on contributing approximately US $11 million.  The PRGF is the IMF’s 
concessional facility for low-income countries.  The PRGF supported programs are based 
on country owned poverty reduction strategies and primarily aims to sustain growth, 
accelerate structural reform, maintain low inflation and exchange rate stability, and 
strengthen debt management.  The program will implement key structural reforms aimed 
at eliminating weaknesses in the banking sector, distortions in the energy sector, 
government interference in the agricultural sector and weak governance.  Additionally, 
any remaining state-owned farms will be restructured and privatized by the end of 2005 
through the issuance of land use and land share certificates.  Economic governance will 
be improved by reducing excessive government intervention in economic affairs, 
enhancing transparence, accountability and economic management.  The National Bank 
of Tajikistan (NBT) will be prohibited from issuing directed credit and making 
expenditures not related to its core business activities or paying dividends while it has 
negative net worth.   
In addition to the above measures provided by the PRGF, Tajikistan will continue 
to receive aid and support for economic reform programs.  Current expenditures are 
projected to rise modestly over the program period, mainly due to increased outlays for 
health, education, and targeted social programs.  The focus of this reform will be to place 
emphasis on problems facing the poor in accessing essential social services.   
The PRGF program will emphasize a 40 percent increase in the public sector 
wage bill for 2003.  This increase will be necessary to bring civil service salaries more in 
line with the private sector, to alleviate poverty among the low paid civil servants in the 
health and education sectors, and to combat corruption.  There has been some argument 
that raising public sector wages across the board is not an effective means of reducing 
poverty.  The wage bill would be more effective if wages were only raised 20 percent. 
The PRGF feels that a gradual increase in tax collections will aid Tajikistan’s 
economy.  “Tax revenues are projected to increase to 15.8 percent of GDP in 2003 from 
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14.1 percent of GDP in 2001.”177 In an effort to achieve this target, a number of tax 
measures have been taken to simplify the income tax structure to broaden the tax base, 
increase the excise tax rates on alcohol and tobacco, and introduce a pilot unified 
agricultural tax in several regions.  In addition, the program will delay the move to the 
VAT on cotton until 2004. 
In addition to the aid received from IMF and World Bank, Tajikistan will 
continue to receive support from the CIS-7.  Tajikistan is part of the CIS-7 Initiative that 
was launched a year ago to address concerns about the severe economic difficulties, 
increases in poverty, and rapid build-up of debt in many CIS-7 countries since 
independence in the early 1990’s.  The countries covered by the Initiative are Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. 
Also, Tajikistan recently signed a Poverty Partnership Agreement with the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) laying down their shared vision for eradicating poverty in the 
country.  The joint strategy for poverty reduction starts with the recognition of the 
multidimensional features of poverty and understanding of the root causes of poverty.  
The ADB notes that while poverty levels in Tajikistan may have intensified since 1991, 
the improvement in the safety and security situation following the successful peace 
process, and the positive and high economic growth rates achieved in recent years have 
stalled a further rise in poverty incidence.  Using the Millennium Development Goals for 
2015 as key targets against which to measure its performance, the Government and ADB 
have set the following as their aims by 2015 to:  “Reduce poverty to 58% from about 
83% in 1999, increase primary education coverage to 90% from 78% in 2000, eliminate 
gender disparity in primary and secondary education, decrease infant mortality by 2010 
to 25 deaths per 1,000 from 37 deaths per 1,000 in 2000, reduce maternal mortality by 
2010 to 35 deaths per 1,000 from 43 deaths per 1,000 in 2000, and improve access to safe 
drinking water to 80% from 51% in 2000.”178 To achieve these targets, both parties have 
agreed to expand job opportunities through pro-poor growth measures and to improve the 
access of the poor to basic social services and targeted social assistance.  “In its program 
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to 2005, ADB plans investment and sector development loans as well as technical 
assistance to Tajikistan in agriculture and rural finance sector development, transport, 
power and energy, water resource management, customs modernization, the social sector, 
and capacity and institutional building on legal and judicial reforms as well as innovative 
poverty reduction measures.”179   
As has been previously mentioned Tajikistan suffers from difficulties within its 
drug treatment programs.  Drug treatment programs are severely under funded.  Regional 
governments have not made them a priority and treatment centers have often been left to 
the regional NGO’s.  In the GBAO region of Tajikistan, local NGO’s claim authorities 
are only able to provide treatment for a very small percentage of the addicts.  Without 
follow-up, most of the addicts who are treated relapse.  The NGO’s dealing with addicts 
in GBAO feel such follow-up should include some type of work placement.  Private 
clinics have also stepped in to fill the treatment inadequacies left by local governments.  
Some are controversial and are seen as doing little beyond making profits out of patients 
and their families.  In Tajikistan, methadone therapy is not legal, although a pilot 
program is being considered.  Kyrgyzstan has announced that they will be starting a 
program of free methadone distribution.  Another problem that NGO’s encounter 
working with drug users is the attitude of public police.  They are generally hostile 
towards users and often arrest those who come to treatment centers or exchange points.  
NGOs have been meeting with police and local officials to explain the programs and 
encourage them to go after drug dealers rather than users.  The fact remains though, that 
more effort has been expended on interdiction than on treatment in Central Asia. 
AIDS awareness and prevention is a serious issue that needs to be addressed.  
Public awareness to HIV/AIDS needs to be given strict attention.  Also, trust points need 
to be established where information on the disease and other sexually transmitted 
infections as well as sterile syringes, condoms, and counseling are available.  Some 
success has been met, but the epidemic is growing rapidly and services need to be made 
available.  For example, Kyrgyzstan allocates a mere $26,500 for AIDS prevention and 
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awareness programs.  Detected HIV cases remain low with only 47 in the year 2000.180  
“Only two, both intravenous drugs users, were reported in Osh, the country’s second city 
and a major transit point for heroin.”181 Only three to four percent of the country’s drug 
users are tested for HIV, and there are concerns that an epidemic could break out.  
Exchange points have found 30-50 percent of returned needles test HIV positive.182 
Chapter three established why the Afghanistan-Tajikistan cross-border trafficking 
is the center of gravity and then analyzed trafficking groups and routes in Afghanistan 
and Tajikistan.  There is a need to recognize that social and political stability, as well as 
wider economic growth, are essential preconditions for eliminating opium poppy 
cultivation on a sustainable basis in Afghanistan.  The elimination of poppy cultivation 
requires an enabling environment to establish the institutions needed for formal 
governance and civil society, as well as promote licit on-farm and off-farm income 
opportunities. 
Poppy growing is the symptom not the cause of poverty.  Indeed it should not be 
seen just as an agricultural problem requiring agricultural solutions but as a multi-faceted 
economic and social problem requiring a wide-ranging approach.  Opium production in 
Afghanistan is different from other large-scale producing areas around the world.  In 
most places, opium is a low-yielding crop produced on marginal land.  However, in the 
major growing areas of Afghanistan, poppy production has become a mainstream crop 
produced on good land as an integral part of the major production system. 
Experience with successful elimination of opium poppy cultivation in other 
countries demonstrate that eliminating poppy cultivation requires substantial commitment 
to long-term development and poverty reduction strategies.  Given the scale of the 
problem, the number of people involved, and the intense economic pressure that drives 
the whole system, there can be no quick fix to eliminating opium production in 
Afghanistan.  It is essential that efforts to improve rural livelihoods are part of broad 
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based economic and social development.  Furthermore, poppy growing should be given 
priority for domestic budgetary allocation and for international assistance. 
Chapter four examined the strategies and capacities of the border agencies and 
how they fall short.  Security problems resulting from the increasing flow of narcotics 
illegally smuggled across the 1200 km Tajikistan-Afghanistan border have become 
critical in understanding the nature of political instability within Central Asia.  One such 
problem and concern is the ability of the Tajik state to combat drug trafficking.  
Tajikistan is severely restricted by its topography, impoverished and stagnant economy, 
pervasive corruption in the political and security bodies and the poor condition of the 
KOGG.  President Rakhmonov is dependent upon the continued security assistance 
provided by the Russian Federation despite public declarations in Dushanbe concerning 
expanding and increasing the role of the KOGG.  If governments in Central Asia are 
serious about wanting stability, corruption is one of the most important issues for them to 
address.  Experience elsewhere has shown that tackling corruption requires a broad 
program of complementary measures, including legislation, higher salaries, less 
bureaucracy and consistent political leadership.  Genuine attempts to implement such 
policies in Central Asia would begin to undermine many of the region’s largest drug 
traffickers. 
C. UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA 
Chapter II emphasized why the United States and Russia have not focused 
attention on the drug trade in the region?  First of all, on August 15, 2003, US Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfield said that “opium production in Afghanistan has gone up 
since the fall of the Taliban regime and he does not know how to curb it.”183 Additionally 
he stated, “And you ask what we are going to do, and the answer is, I don’t really know.  
I think it’s an awfully tough problem.”184 Mr. Rumsfield said the Afghan heroin was a 
bigger problem for Europe and Russia rather than the US because it’s mainly smuggled to 
the European nations.  He said Britain has taken the lead in trying to curb the production 
of opium, which is used for making heroin, in Afghanistan because “they have the 
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greatest concern about it.  The United States has offered to help the UK.” 185 He does not 
want the,  
Over-stretched 8,000 US soldiers in Afghanistan to become sidetracked 
from their main goal:  to capture and kill terrorists.  And chasing drug 
smugglers could take away allies from the Americans.186  
Obviously, the United Kingdom is not able to take on the fight against drug 
trafficking alone.  Russia will have to continue to provide assistance and manpower to the 
region.  Additionally, the United States needs to step up efforts in the region to stop the 
flow of illegal drugs from Afghanistan to Europe.  Corruption in the Tajik government is 
stopping the country from becoming more stable and able to fight the drug war.  Steps are 
being taken to better the economy of Tajikistan and the United States is still working 
closely with the Afghanistan government to bring about stability.  Unfortunately, time 
will either help or hurt the Central Asian region.  One thing is for sure, the drug trade is 
flourishing through the northern route of Afghanistan, into Tajikistan and on through 
Europe.  Unless Russia and the United States collaborate and utilize the assistance of 
other European countries (like the UK) drug use and trafficking will become greater than 
it has ever been! 
 
                                                 
185 Ibid, p. 1. 
186 McGirk, Tim. “Drugs?  What Drugs?” Time, 18 August 2003, p. 23. 
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